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
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Soviet Union

International Affairs

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Soviet Union

International Affairs

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Ideology's Harmful Effect on Foreign Policy

*91UF0654A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 91
Union Edition p 6*

[Article by Yevgeniy Bazhanov, doctor of historical science: "What Are Our State Interests? Reflections on Soviet Foreign Policy"]

[Text] I recently had the opportunity to participate in a seminar at which professional diplomats attempted to understand just what the USSR's state interests consist of. The speakers arrived at the opinion that Moscow has been invariably guided by ideological motives alone since 1917. Right out they are moving into the background but the modern concept of state interests has not yet been elaborated.

Permit me to express my own point of view on this issue. First of all, I want to understand: what do the fundamental goals of any state consist of? In my opinion, there are three: Insure security from external threats; satisfy the material and spiritual needs of the population; and, protect the country's political and economic positions on the world arena and increase its influence. We can designate the tasks facing every government in concise form: "Security, prosperity, and prestige."

As for the first two goals, it seems that everything is clear here. The inability to attain them will sooner or later result in the fact that the ruling regime will fall either by the hands of foreign enemies or by those of its own people. The most varied causes may encourage the attainment of the third goal of power, both entirely natural causes and those from incorrectly understood national interests, reassessments of our own state's capabilities, and also from subjective reasons—our political leaders' qualities. We all know instances from world history when an excessive increase of super-power expansionist activity was stimulated by a dictator's ambitions (Napoleon), religious fanaticism (the Arabs, beginning with the 7th Century and later the Crusaders), racism (Hitler's Germany), Messianism and instinct for self-preservation (the United States after the Second World War).

If you analyze Soviet history, it is obvious that ideology in its pure form almost never entirely determined Moscow's foreign policy. In the post-Revolutionary period, messianic motives and the desire to utilize the capabilities of the outside world for the development of its own productive forces coexisted in it. In the 1940's, concern about the country's survival and the attainment of victory in the bloody war eclipsed all of the rest. Immediately after it ended, Stalin created regimes according to the Soviet model and likeness along the perimeter of the USSR's borders not nearly for "love of art", that is, from ideological fervor. He thought that the presence of communist governments would permit the strengthening of state security and better satisfy the Soviet Union's economic needs. Superpower motives and the craving to rule peoples who had at one time been in the Russian empire's sphere of influence also played their role. The

communist parties were used like convenient "transmission belts" to implement the above mentioned schemes.

In the 1950's through 1970's, the superpower motive gradually drowned out all other impulses in our policy. A struggle for planetary supremacy was occurring with the United States on the altar of which everything was offered up indiscriminately, including the vital needs of the Soviet people. And solidarity with the communists (for example, in the Arab countries, where it was advantageous to make friends with anti-American Muslims, zealous opponents of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and communist hangers-on). They also scorned security when ambition dulled Kremlin leaders to such a degree that they, in addition to the United States, had a thorough falling out with China and moved troops into Afghanistan, thus arousing the anger of the majority of UN members.

The results of this foreign policy course are sad in all regards. Although astronomical sums and superhuman efforts were spent on strengthening defense, it did not add any certainty to a peaceful tomorrow. On the contrary, the thicker the fence of Soviet missiles became, the tighter the hostile ring became around our borders and the more refined the weapons systems became that were targeted on the USSR's cities and villages. The number of enemies increased in geometric progression since almost all of the largest and most powerful states of modern times—the United States, Japan, China, England, the FRG, France, Canada, and Italy—joined their ranks. The country's security was under obvious threat. We also cannot make it a question of satisfaction of another fundamental goal of the state—the people's prosperity.

Straining under the arms race, withering without fresh ideas, and ignored by prospective partners, our economy hopelessly lagged behind world progress. It is true that some people assert that, on the other hand, the Homeland had high international prestige and they respected us. During the many years of "stagnation," I worked abroad and sensed this "respect" in abundance. In an American middle school, for a long time students tried to find out from me why the Soviet government was using thousands of agents to hunt down a feeble, elderly man named Sakharov, instead of turning its attention to the problem of infant mortality, for example. I had an opportunity to observe a Soviet tourist faint in a food store when he saw the local sausage and cheese.

Inevitable perestroika ultimately arrived in our land. In a record period of short time, we became reconciled with those people who used to be our sworn enemies, we managed to forget about the threat of a third world war, and we began to burn less money in the bonfire of the arms race. They recognized us as normal people and began to respect us. And nevertheless a chorus of internal critics of the renewed Soviet foreign policy is growing. We are hearing rebukes that Moscow has been deprived of allies and that the Americans command in the world

arena (for example—the Persian Gulf zone) and that the USSR has lost its superpower status.

How can we answer this? About allies. Ceausescu and Zhivkov were Brezhnev's and Suslov's comrades in arms through the defense and expansion of barracks administrative-command "socialism" which we are aggressively fighting right now. Previous alliances not only did not insure the USSR's real state security but, on the contrary, undermined it. First of all, because they not only turned members of NATO but also many other countries into our enemies. Second, because our friends in Warsaw or Prague were frequently false friends and worse than many of our enemies in Rome or Copenhagen. We only had to loosen our hold and our "little brothers" ran away and in so doing they hurl curses at the Soviet Union and destroy monuments to our soldier-liberators. Some of our remaining allies in the Far East also cause doubt. They obviously do not like to like us. Our strategic embrace with them only worsens the mistrust toward Moscow in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region and reduces the already paltry native treasury. And the only "value" of these types of "friends" is the prospect of fighting side by side with them in a world war which our comrades in arms will unleash themselves.

Now with regard to Washington's domination in the Persian Gulf. Let us not forget that the Americans invited us to participate in the punishment of Saddam Hussein and therefore to totally share the victory laurels. We voluntarily refused because we did not consider either participation in the war or in the postwar "domination" to be responsive to our own national interests.

Well, about the fact that the Soviet Union, they say, has ceased being a superpower, so is this really the reason for flexibility in Soviet diplomacy? We can gain superpower status only after having attained outstanding achievements in economics, science, technology, culture, democracy, and ideology and having astonished the rest of the world with our success. To begin with, we need to overcome the economic crisis, settle international conflicts, stabilize the political situation, and elaborate and implement an effective model of development. It is also obvious that not only public figures who are experiencing superpower nostalgia but also all Soviet people who desire a simply normal, civilized life need to put the state in order. The issue consists of how to arrive at the sought after goal.

In this regard, the experience of certain other countries, specifically our neighbors in the East, comes to mind. In the 19th Century, the Western powers increased pressure on Asia while attempting to seize control of its resources. How did local governments react to the challenge? Some surrendered without a fight. Others attempted to fight them off but the colonizers, possessing indisputable military technical superiority, easily overcame the dare-devils. Still others, specifically China, decided to withdraw into themselves like snails and ignore their uninvited guests. Emperor Tsan-lun [Khun Li], in response to the English king's invitation to trade, stated: "... Our

Heavenly Empire has all things in enormous abundance and no product exists that we cannot find within its borders. Therefore, there is no need to import foreign barbarians' manufactured goods in exchange for our products." Bureaucrats refused the foreigners proposals to build a railroad, jokingly replying with references to fears of disturbing the dragon that lived under the ground. They refused to open a steamship line on the Yangtze because monkeys in a habitat near the river might attack the extraordinary mechanical monsters. However, China did not manage to isolate itself from abroad and it was reduced to the state of a semi-colony. The same fate awaited the other hermit state of the Far East—Korea.

But the Japanese chose a quite different method of resisting pressure from without. They turned out to be the only country that dared to radically restructure their society and they adopted all the secrets of economic and scientific-technical progress from the "foreign devils." It was extraordinarily complicated to mobilize the population to such feats. People had to live, work, and think in a new way and stop looking at the outside world as at something alien, and moreover—had to enter it. Another problem also seemed no less difficult—taking the best from abroad without losing their own personality and remain Japanese. The Emperor Meiji's reforms, that began in 1886, were conducted under the slogans "respect the emperor and banish the barbarians" and the creation of a "rich country and strong army" that are understood by and dear to Japanese hearts. Japan soaked up foreign experience like a sponge and its residents understood that this was being done precisely to prevent foreign bondage. So, naturally, it turned out that: having turned out to be capable students, the Japanese soon robustly stood on their own two feet and even began to dictate their will to others. As for Japanese traditions, the new elements were just added to the old structures without destroying them. In the 1960's and 1970's, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong used something similar to the Japanese method. In the 1980's, the former Heavenly Empire and current PRC [People's Republic of China] also subordinated all of its domestic and foreign policy to the interests of modernization. And it immediately accomplished a perceptible spurt in its progress toward prosperity.

If we attempt to extrapolate the Asian experience to our reality, the conclusion suggests itself: Do not isolate yourself from other civilizations, merge into them, and adopt everything that is better (without losing our native spiritual and material dignity). That is the only way to successfully approximate the locomotive of economic and scientific-technical progress that is rapidly surging ahead, to create a prosperous society in which we will live better and which will begin to be respected (and not feared) abroad, and which will attract and not repel.

What do we need to do to attain this? First of all, once and for all refrain from the mangle of the arms race and the irrepressible passion to absolutely have just as many aircraft carriers or cruise missiles as the Pentagon. The

pursuit of senseless parity everywhere and in everything will ultimately undermine our sick economy which will ricochet into that very security for whose sake we are allegedly stockpiling mountains of weapons. The threat to the state is not only increasing from without but also from within—the population that has been reduced to despair will stop enduring the superpower exercises of the authorities (remember how the people rejected Kerensky's hoorah-patriotic line in 1917?).

Second, even without this, it is time to generally cease competition with the United States on any grounds. It has become a habit since the times of ideological confrontation and many of us cannot understand that the haunting mania is somehow overplayed and that teasing traditional competitors causes more harm than good to the Homeland in some places. People who adhere to the logic of confrontation love to cite the activities of the "hawks" across the ocean. But as before those hawks look at the USSR through ideological glasses and see us as Stalinists. Moscow's every bitter step brings them to ecstasy and is aggressively used by them to restore a confrontational spirit in the United States. On the other hand, the Kremlin's reasonable, flexible policy causes confusion among American ultra-right wingers because it promotes the reinforcement of Washington's positions on detente, disarmament, and cooperation.

Third, the time has come to really open the economy to foreign capital, technology, and ideas. We have nothing to fear from them. No one has engulfed the United States—neither Japanese nor West European business, although both have freely made themselves felt in the American market! Moreover, the question is even about transforming the United States into the only superpower in the world! As we have already noted, they have hardly suffered from the "foreign devils"—the Japanese, South Koreans, and Chinese.

This is the only way we can cure the economy, finally create a worthy life for ourselves, provide conditions for preserving the multinational state and, on this basis—we will guarantee the country's security and its strong positions on a planetary level. As you can imagine, our basic state interest consists of this.

USSR's Postwar Foreign Policy Interests Discussed

91UF0627A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 11, Mar 91 pp 22-25

[Discussion among Doctor of Economic Sciences Sergey Blagovolin, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Igor Malashenko, and *NOVOYE VREMYA* observer Vladimir Razuvayev: "The War Is Over. What Will the Peace Be Like?"]

[Text] The conflict has changed international relations. In the future interdependence will be stronger, but confrontations more dangerous.

[Razuvayev] There is no doubt that the war in the Gulf and the entire "raft" of international relations connected with it will be of tremendous significance for the shaping of the future structure of peace. But in order to identify the emergent trends it is essential to assign this event or set of events even a more or less precise place.

[Blagovolin] The war just ended was the start of a new era in the history of international relations. Several events coincided in time. These included the end of East-West confrontation, the natural diminution at this stage in the global role of the Soviet Union, and the rapid emergence in the world arena of new subjects of international relations of the Saddam Iraq type (I shall not venture now to name others lest I look like a fortune-teller, but I am afraid that we will soon see for ourselves that Husayn's regime was no exception). The states of the last group feel themselves done out not of wealth, in the main, but influence. The danger is that these new subjects of international relations could have at their disposal effective means of pursuing a confrontational policy, both military and economic (among the latter, I refer primarily to control of energy resources), what is more.

But this stage of world politics can under no circumstances be considered a "Pax americana". Americans are well aware—and the war in the Gulf proved this—that their interests lie primarily in the creation of an interdependent balanced world system. And U.S. policy since the war has been geared to the revelation and use of a multitude of props of mutual support, codevelopment, and growing mutual responsibility.

[Malashenko] The interaction between the USSR and the United States at the time of the conflict shows that the new period in international relations has already set in. Earlier Soviet-American rivalry was the catalyst of many regional conflicts, but simultaneously curbed the aggressive motivations of regimes of the Saddam type. When the picture of the world changed, leaders like Husayn were able to spot their opportunity here.

The lessons of the crisis just ended will continue to be analyzed. I would like, now, however, to mention the following. Following the end of the "cold war," there were illusions that the "utility" of weapons in international relations would diminish sharply. It is notable that Saddam Husayn did not share these illusions. Moreover, the military level of the response he obtained for his claims was so impressive that there is something to think about here also.

The stage in international relations that has begun can under no circumstances, of course, be characterized as a "Pax americana." The fact that the United States "required" financial assistance of its allies shows that American power has its limits and that the Americans know them and realize that the world the international community is entering is far more complex than all the definitions we may think up for it.

[Razuvayev] Describing the current period, you used the terms "interdependence" and "codevelopment." Does this mean that, in your opinion, political scientists may forever or, at least, for a while abandon the "power centers" concept when characterizing international relations?

[Blagovolin] I do not believe that the concepts are mutually contradictory. Earlier, given a bipolar structure of the world, there were two "power centers," which confronted one another. Now the situation is far more complex. One obvious "power center" is the United States. A second is West Europe, which is emphatically taking the path of integration, really embodying in practice the "unity in diversity" slogan. Finally, the third "power center" is Japan. Add to these the "subcenters of power," among which are a whole number of new industrial countries. And "negative" "power centers" are emerging simultaneously. They are unwilling to spend years in agonizing attempts to optimize their development processes. These are totalitarian regimes, which are oriented, to put it simply, toward elementary plunder. And an "explosive" production is emerging: on the one hand the "old" "power centers" contributing to interdependence, which should "guard" this process against encroachments, on the other, a growing number of potential threats to the new phenomenon which is taking shape. It is important to bear in mind here that, granted all its severity, the East-West confrontation was controllable. But the new confrontation cannot be controlled. I, incidentally, am absolutely unconvinced that the value of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty will under these circumstances be more than that of the paper on which it is written. Possible agreements on controlling the spread of missile technology and chemical weapons will hardly be in any way meaningful either. The genie is out of the bottle....

[Malashenko] I am sure that an analysis of the international situation from a "power centers" position has far from lost its significance. But it is important to introduce one limitation here—there has been a change in the very concept of "power." About 50 years ago the military power of a state was a cumulative, summary indicator of overall state power. This is far from being the case now, and will be even less so in the future. Other parameters of power, including economic might, are very important. In reaching out to control oil resources, Saddam Husayn understood this full well, incidentally.

If we look truth in the eye, the aggregate might of the USSR, as a "power center," is diminishing at this time. Until the country emerges from the period of internal breakup and transformation, this trend will continue. At the same time, however, the United States is preserving its former power. Does this mean that the world is becoming unipolar? I do not think so. The other "power centers," including the USSR, are increasing or at least preserving their significance independently of the United States. The USSR was, is, and will remain a great Eurasian power, which merely on account of its geopolitical position and vast resources could exert an

immense influence on international affairs. There is no reason to doubt that all the other characters of international politics, including the United States, will be reckoning with the USSR.

The issue is that international order should be manageable. This is now, when the "rules of the game" have become more complicated, more difficult than before. But it seems to me that the war in the Gulf clarified some of them. The next Saddam Husayn should think hard before deciding on such an adventure. And I do not entirely agree with the opinion concerning the value of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In itself the treaty means, truly, no more than a piece of paper. But if it is backed by real guarantees, including "power" guarantees given by several of the great powers, what is more, the temptation to use nuclear weapons would be curbable to a considerable extent. Just think, Husayn could have used chemical and, evidently, bacteriological weapons in the war. Nonetheless, he did not. There is a threshold at which deterrence begins to work even with respect to such people....

[Blagovolin] Granted all the nobility of the coalition's goals at the time of the war in the Gulf, it should not be forgotten that this was an action in an area that is of vital importance to the functioning of all of modern civilization. Without the oil resources of this region the world economy would come to a halt, and this did not have to be proved to the public opinion of the countries involved in the conflict. But I can easily imagine a conflict in which **immediate** negative consequences for the world economic system do not ensue. Would a coalition capable of acting so decisively and efficiently as the anti-Saddam coalition be created with the same ease?

[Razuvayev] While subscribing to the notes of skepticism that have been heard here, I would like to recall that simultaneously with the crisis surrounding the Persian Gulf, Libya intervened in the events in Chad. It went unnoticed by any in any way significant character of world politics. As far as Saddam Husayn's decision not to use chemical weapons against the coalition forces is concerned, it was explained, of course, not by the nobility of the Baghdad dictator but by far more telling factors. One of them lies on the surface—the aggressor was supported neither directly nor indirectly by a single permanent member of the UN Security Council. Yet there is in our country a group of people who would readily have seen the USSR mixed up in the conflict on the side of Iraq. Of course, this opinion is supported by a very small part of the population. But when, in the latter half of the 1940's, Stalin moved toward a "cold" confrontation with the United States, the peoples of the USSR, weakened from World War II, were hardly burning with a desire to become involved in a new conflict. True, the influence of public opinion in our country on foreign policy is now far greater than 50 years ago, but we hardly have a right to exclude even the theoretical possibility of attempts at a return to the bipolar structure of the world. And some newspapers and

journals are even providing prescriptions as to how to achieve this—alignment with the South in its opposition to the North.

[Blagovolin] We should not delude ourselves into thinking that such a policy is supported currently by a small part of the population. In the postwar period the policy of confrontation was predetermined by the fact that among those thirsting for it was Stalin. We have no such figure now, fortunately. Nonetheless, there are many influential persons among those who would have liked to have seen the Soviet Union "on the other side" in the recent conflict.

But let us imagine for a moment that the Soviet foreign policy course had proceeded along this line. With whom, then, could a bloc be formed in the "third world"? With India? Its leadership has perfectly obviously adopted a policy of long-term cooperation with the West. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the majority of the oil-producing countries? Under no circumstances. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico? The ASEAN countries? Once again, no. But in this case with whom to enter into an alliance against the West? In practice none of the possible alliances would afford even the least opportunity for a restoration of bipolarity.

And let us further recognize that if the "third world" were suddenly to take it into its head to unite against the North and choose itself a leader, the latter would be China, and only China: the half-European origins of the USSR are so obvious that they predetermine the results of the hypothetical choice. China is close to the "third world" and it has pursued a far more subtle and balanced policy throughout recent years. And forgive me for my total cynicism, but unless the Soviet Union gets out of the crisis, China will in the foreseeable future surpass it in terms of power and will even in respect of this factor be more attractive to the "third world" than the USSR. Therefore if the concept of the USSR's "transition" from the North to the South were to be accomplished, even after this the Soviet Union would be playing not a leading but secondary part. We would add that this transition would bring about colossal political stratification in the country....

[Malashenko] I do not believe that it is expedient to draw a demarcation line between North and South generally. In fact, this division is purely abstract. There are different countries and, at most, different groups of countries. And no more. Is the Soviet Union part of the North, say? Generally, yes, but it is sufficient to compare our country with the United States and West Europe to easily ascertain that if the USSR does represent the North, it is a highly specific part of it.... Nor is the South united. It is now impossible to distinguish some one dominant to divide the world into two parts.

[Razuvayev] But was it ever?

[Malashenko] Yes, and quite recently, what is more. It was ideology. But now the idea of uniting half of mankind against the other half according to the ideological

principle is simply madness. The world is more complex and polychromatic than appears to us. But as for the rest, I agree: The USSR could offer the "third world," in an attempt to head it, nothing.

[Razuvayev] Weapons?

[Malashenko] The military-industrial complex in the USSR exists, as before. It manufactures products which have to go somewhere. And inasmuch as the domestic market is constantly diminishing, one's gaze, naturally, turns outward. But it is not only a question of the subjective desires, so to speak, of the Soviet military-industrial complex but of objective trends also. The Near and Middle East are demanding weapons, and in very large quantities, what is more. For understandable reasons the applications are being addressed primarily to the West, but the long term is important for us: The arms market will not shrink in the immediate future. This is why I am convinced that it is time to embark in earnest on the establishment of realistic control over the arms trade.

[Razuvayev] In the structure of the world in which we have just found ourselves a tremendous role should be performed by the United Nations. It is important that this role necessarily be performed—either by the presence of the United Nations in all world affairs or its absence....

[Blagovolin] I believe that the significance of the United Nations will largely depend on whether the present policy of the Soviet leadership geared to cooperation with the West continues. If so, the United Nations could be effectively involved in the preservation of world order. It is clear that the role of the UN Security Council will grow. I would like to emphasize here that the number of its permanent members is not a magical one. It was determined by the results of World War II. But is it not, finally, time we ceased to consider Germany and Japan vanquished countries? Is their voice in the international community still less ponderable than the voices of Great Britain, France and, yes, if you like, both the Soviet Union and the United States?

[Malashenko] I believe that the United Nations passed the test of strength set by the crisis in the Persian Gulf. A particular role here was performed by three powers—the United States, the USSR, and China. In my opinion, our country has underestimated the fact that George Bush is not, by standard yardsticks, a conventional American President. I believe that his predecessor would have "backed" unilateral measures on the part of the United States during this crisis. But Bush was able to put together a coalition, taking advantage of the possibilities of the United Nations for this. But the "key word" for realization of this possibility belonged, for all that, to Moscow (China's "constructive silence" should not be forgotten here, of course).

I agree that the United Nations is imperfect. But I do not believe that the time has come to enlarge the composition of the permanent members of the Security Council,

if only because this would immediately bring about competition for access to the "select club." And not only competition but also grievances—why, say, Germany, not Japan, or why Germany and Japan, not Italy, and so forth. I believe that while bearing in mind the inevitable imperfection of all organizations and of all else created by the hand and mind of man, we need to try to extract all that is positive which the United Nations now possesses.

[Razuvayev] For the Soviet Union, as for all other countries, incidentally, the crisis surrounding the Gulf was a serious test. And it is not that hard to assume that the consequences of this test will be reflected in our domestic political life....

[Blagovolin] It is perfectly clear that the coalition of developed and developing countries which coped with the Husayn regime is functioning. So the real question amounts to determination of the place of the Soviet Union: in the ranks of the coalition or in opposition to it. While the USSR was making a certain contribution to the crisis and was adhering to it precisely in its policy, our country was admitted to the ranks of the coalition even without direct participation in the conflict.

I would emphasize that the USSR's attempts to prompt Husayn to agree to concessions could and should have been an integral part of Soviet policy at the time of the crisis. But when articles claiming that the coalition was going beyond the mandate given it by the UN Security Council and that it was time in this connection that the USSR had "its say" (I find it hard to imagine, it is true, what could have been said in this case) began to appear in Soviet press organs, including those it is customary to call "semiofficial," the following hidden reef was revealed.... The mentality of many influential persons contains, it transpired, the thought: Let us just trip "them" up, we'll get at least something out of this.... But this is an extraordinarily dangerous mentality. It seems to me that this conclusion is for the USSR a most important lesson of the crisis surrounding the events in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union occupied at the time of the conflict a position which was justified from all viewpoints. We should not have created the impression that it could have abandoned it. An attempt at a "flanking movement" could only have harmed the international positions of the USSR, and it remains merely to thank fate that the war ended before this direction of policy had taken more definite shape.

And concerning the so-called "Muslim factor" in the USSR. I believe that its seriousness in our country is connected primarily with the position in which the "Islamic outlying districts" find themselves. For decades the Soviet authorities trumpeted the prosperity of these areas, but upon verification it transpired that there is neither prosperity nor concern for Muslim culture nor tact in interethnic relations. At the same time the "Muslim factor" within the country should not be unduly linked with foreign policy. I would recall that

Muslim countries also participated in the anti-Iraq coalition, and there was no uprising against the authorities in any of them.

[Malashenko] It seems to me that Soviet policy at the time of the conflict was close to the optimum. Nuances are nuances, but on the whole the difference in the Soviet and American approaches correctly reflected the difference in the two countries' interests in this region. There could, indeed, be an argument over the tactics. The Iraqi "trump cards" should certainly not have been exaggerated, and we should have been more strict in insisting that Baghdad accept the coalition's proposals without any conditions. But Soviet interests amounted quite certainly to ensuring that the conflict that had begun end with the minimum use of military force.

In principle both the USSR and the West have an equal interest in stability in the Near and Middle East. The question is which way to achieve it. For the USSR it is far more important that it be achieved peacefully. Here, incidentally, the Soviet Union has much in common with the Europeans, who are also in principle opposed to the use of military force in the Near East. But when the conflict in the Gulf had gone so far, there was no longer an alternative to a military solution. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that any clash could have unpredictable consequences. The "shock waves" from the war in the Gulf are perfectly capable of causing new "tremors," including in our country.

Both at the present time and in the future the USSR will continue to have interests in three key areas—Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Near and Middle East. As far as the last direction is concerned, the USSR, it seems to me, has an interest in the preservation of stable regional order. Soviet interests may only be secured here by way of constructive interaction with the West, primarily with the United States. I am sure that the United States is prepared to cooperate with the USSR in this region. The partial concurrence of the two powers' interests is the basis on which it is necessary to build their relations in the Near and Middle East. But contradictions should not be feared either. From this viewpoint I see nothing wrong in the fact that the USSR raised the question of the extent of the Security Council mandate. It is always necessary to aspire to complete clarity.

As a whole, however, the USSR should abandon the instinctive habits of acting everywhere, in the Near and Middle East region included, in defiance of the interests of the United States. And Washington, in turn, should reconsider its orientation toward "deterrence" of the Soviet Union in this region. I believe that the United States is prepared to go beyond a policy of deterrence. For the Soviet Union this is fundamentally important for it is now more interested than ever in stability around the perimeter of its state borders.

RSFSR Foreign Minister Interviewed

91UF0615A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 9, Mar 91 pp 8-10

[Interview with Andrey Kozyrev, RSFSR minister of foreign affairs, by Vladimir Razuvayev, *NOVOYE VREMYA* commentator: "The Minister's 100 Days"]

[Text] [Razuvayev] In your initial interviews as minister of foreign affairs of the RSFSR, you said that your main objective, for the foreseeable future, would be to ensure foreign political support for the "500 days" program. The program was not drafted. The discussion and ratification of the foreign policy concept of Russia, planned for January, was postponed. How do you feel being a minister without the necessary guidelines?

[Kozyrev] In exactly the same way as the other members of the Russian government. Foreign policy sovereignty always derives from domestic political sovereignty. The latter, as we know, does not exist yet.

[Razuvayev] More than 100 days have passed since you were appointed minister of foreign affairs. In politics, this period is considered sufficient for summing up initial results....

[Kozyrev] I would say that we—I am referring to the entire Russian government—together with the center have learned how effectively to block each other. The task now is to learn how to accomplish things just as efficiently. My initial impressions from my membership in the government allows me to say that the attempt on the part of the center to ignore the republic is as pernicious as the attempt on the part of some republics to pretend that the center does not exist.

[Razuvayev] These are your impressions as member of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. What can you say as minister of foreign affairs?

[Kozyrev] Only scattered bits have remained from the "500 days" program, which the government nonetheless is trying to implement. The republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it its task to ensure favorable foreign conditions for such a policy. All too frequently, however, reaching the desired target is hindered by unexpected steps taken by the union government. For example, quite recently I paid an official visit to the FRG, together with Silayev, Russia's prime minister. The purpose of the trip was to develop a favorable atmosphere for business relations between German businessmen and our Republic. We appear to have achieved some results. However, the statement by Pavlov, the union prime minister, about a "conspiracy of bankers" cast a shadow on what we had been able to create in the course of that trip. Even the fiercest supporters of the Cold War would have been unable to achieve a more negative effect concerning our relations with Germany than Pavlov. Essentially, he questioned the possibility of trusting the Soviet Union in the economic area. In the United States, to the best of my knowledge, the reaction

to his words was one of rejection. It is not merely a question that the Western bankers were precisely and conversely ready to support perestroika and the Soviet president. The essence is the threat of the revival of a caveman's way of thinking, the mentality of a besieged fortress, in which the surrounding world is seen as eminently hostile to our country. And when this is based on the government's expropriation measures, I am referring to the so-called "currency exchange," the attitude of the bankers toward the USSR becomes totally negative. The West is interested above all in whether the state respects the right of ownership and the right of owners. If there is no such respect, what kind of business with such a country could be possible?

[Razuvayev] At one point, Soviet experts included among the main obstacles to the development of Western capital the so-called "war of laws."...

[Kozyrev] I do not like this concept in the least. A discrepancy between laws and regulations exists in some foreign countries as well. However, in such countries this is never a reason for worsening social tension. They simply speak of "harmonizing the laws."... In the United States and the FRG, for example, states and provinces have their own laws which are frequently different from those of the federal governments. However, no one considers this a particular problem. Incidentally, the reason is entirely clear: not to frighten foreign capital. I would start by explaining to the business circles in the West that we have no "war of laws" in our country, for in our country there is simply a historically natural process of adopting the new rules of the game taking place. It is true that such an entirely legitimate phenomenon has a tendency to develop into some kind of internal "cold war," and not only because some people consider Yeltsin a rival in the struggle for power....

Now, however, in the West the conviction is developing that once again a return to anti-market, anti-business, and anti-Western concepts is taking place in the central power structures of the USSR. Concerning this obstacle, we cannot tell our partners that it is the result of growth and that it could be harmonized. Therefore, in the immediate future one may fear a turn toward the too-hastily forgotten times of isolation and of technological boycott of our country.

[Razuvayev] To the best of my knowledge, the likelihood exists for the government of which you are a part to expect soon difficulties in parliament, and that one of the main targets of criticism will be you, personally. In your view, what could you be criticized for?

[Kozyrev] I indeed do not exclude the likelihood that I may become the target of attacks on the part of some legislators. In parliament, as in society at large, efforts are being made to look for "enemys." As to what they could criticize.... I do not deny that I have made many errors, for the past few months have been quite difficult and it is only he who does nothing that never makes a mistake. I believe, however, that the main reason for

criticism "from the right" may be the participation of the ministry in the drafting of interrepublic treaties and organizing interrepublic relations. Some critics consider such activities a confirmation of the aspiration on the part of the Russian leadership to "break down the Union," and to convert relations among republics to international relations. I believe that the unwillingness to accept this aspect of the activities of the ministry is backed by the unwillingness to see the realities of our time. For 70 years the country suffered from an ideologized approach to foreign policy. Efforts are now being made to shift this approach to relations among republics....

The RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not engaged in talks with similar ministries of other Union republics on concluding treaties. This is the work of the deputy groups. Our ministry only participates in drafting the treaties, seeing that they are consistent with the standards of international law. Such participation is entirely justified, for the already established standards of international law encompass the experience acquired in the course of solving many problems which are relevant to our country—social, humanitarian, economic, national, and interrepublic.... I have spent my entire professional life in settling conflicts. It would be simply criminal on my part not to try to apply my knowledge and experience in that area. Many of the known methods for resolving conflicts have proved to be the right ones in other countries and are already justifying or are about to justify their use in the USSR.

The other aspect of the problem is that I simply am unwilling to accept the "false alternative"—totalitarian unitarism. This system deprives of their share not only the Baltic or Central Asian peoples but also Russia. Let us frankly say that our country was considered a threat in the international arena largely because of its totalitarian nature. I would also classify as part of that "false alternative" the possibility of an explosion of hostility in relations among republics, for this could only lead to a future of other "Berlin walls" among republics, and endless territorial redivisions accompanied by armed clashes and wars.

[Razuvayev] As I understand it, through your activities you wish to oppose this "false alternative" with something different....

[Kozyrev] There also is a "civilized alternative." That is what our ministry has tried to work for in recent months. Frankly speaking, I am proud to have participated in this effort. We draw attention to the unification trends abroad, to the model of Western European integration. Naturally, we take into consideration the differences in the situation, but I am confident that the main "blocks" of the integration model could apply under our circumstances.

Usually, the opponents of such a solution point out that the republic boundaries do not accurately reflect the ethnic composition of the population. Even if such is the

case, does this mean that now the republic must engage in endless territorial disputes? For centuries, Germany and France fought over Alsace-Lorraine, before realizing the principle of a civilized solution of this old conflict. They simply made the border conventional. We must adopt the same solutions. My activities as minister are aimed at helping, to a certain extent, the process of integration among republics and the creation of a renovated Union as a community of sovereign states.

Quite recently, an event took place in Tallinn which, from my point of view, constitutes a historical change in relations between Russia and the Baltic republics. On the basis of a treaty between Russia and Estonia, we held an international meeting of experts in human rights. Specialists from eight European countries studied Estonian legislation and practices, and met with representatives of all political trends and ethnic groups. It turned out that in Estonia there indeed exist frictions among the members of the different national and ethnic groups, but for the most part they are on the level of everyday life. The legislation is by no means perfect. As a whole, however, it is on the average European level. Possibilities for improving legal standards in Estonia were also earmarked. From my viewpoint this is precisely the civilized method of resolving conflicts. We became convinced that its application is possible even under most difficult circumstances, and even despite the fact that blood had been recently shed in neighboring republics.

[Razuvayev] For some time now a debate has been taking place in the United States on shifting the emphasis of American policy toward the USSR in the sense of developing contacts with republics and "local" democratic administrations. It is a question not of relying on forces which oppose the Kremlin but, rather, of developing parallel relations with the central leadership and with republic and local authorities.

[Kozyrev] I believe that this is the right trend. I personally, both in the USSR and abroad, have always encouraged such a "constructive parallelism." Naturally, we must not face the foreign partners with a choice which would be dangerous or difficult for them to make: either the Union or the republics. From my viewpoint, relations should develop on a parallel basis, i.e., both with the Union and the republics. Russia has an interest in having the shoots of new relations between the USSR and the West not only preserved but also strengthened.

[Razuvayev] You are just back from the United States and this was your first visit as a minister. Did you notice any sign which may lead us to hope for any progress in what you describe as "constructive parallelism?"

[Kozyrev] Great attention was paid to the Russian delegation. Naturally, I was pleased with the understanding of the new role played by republics in the USSR and their foreign policy. Nonetheless, the increased attention paid by the Americans, frankly speaking, was not entirely pleasing to me. In addition to sympathy for and interest in Russian policy, there was an entirely

obvious disappointment in the prospects of relations with the Kremlin. It is feared in the United States that the Soviet leadership has begun to abandon the principles which had lifted Soviet-American relations to their present level. Naturally, this was of concern to me, for one cannot create a favorable climate for international investment in a separate republic. Our efforts can only be a supplement and development of what is achieved through the policy pursued by the union government. That is why we would not like it to slide back into its old positions. Furthermore, I would support a forward thrust, leading to a policy of common sense.

As a whole, however, I found in the United States very great promises for the development of a "constructive parallelism" or, as such a policy is described here by some, a "two-track movement." I would particularly single out the interesting opportunities for cooperation between Russian areas and American states. Incidentally, such cooperation could take place with other countries as well, such as the FRG. The concept that along with a "Europe of states" a "Europe of regions" should develop is becoming increasingly popular. It is precisely in such a case that cooperation could prove and is proving to be much more productive than along the line of intergovernmental relations.

The fact that in the USSR the independence of the regions is on a terribly low level is a different matter. It sounds funny, but the German provinces have much greater rights in resolving their problems than has the leadership of the RSFSR. For example, we have had no foreign exchange budget. When Russian delegations go abroad, they must procure their money by inconceivable methods. Meanwhile, any Western European area is autonomous in handling its expenditures. I would rather not characterize our situation....

[Razuvayev] Is it degrading to use aid?

[Kozyrev] Yes, let us be blunt, it is degrading. Looked at more broadly, however, we should not limit the discussion merely to this aspect of the problem. One must defend one's dignity mainly through other means and, above all, through a civilized policy. For 70 years Soviet diplomats themselves had to pay for their expenses, traveling from conference to conference without earning any respect. I recall the way immediately after the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan, there were crowds of demonstrators chanting "murderers!" in front of Soviet missions abroad. Incidentally, my recent trip to the United States unexpectedly reminded me of a past experience: I was asked far too many questions about the Baltic bloodshed. It is true that on that occasion I could answer with a clear conscience that both Yeltsin and the Russian leadership were in favor of talks and not of the use of tanks in the Baltic area. It seems to me that defending the dignity of the state is achieved precisely by holding such a position.

[Razuvayev] A great deal is being said about the conflict between Russia and the center. Can you tell us how you personally are interacting with the union level Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Kozyrev] Personally, from the very beginning, I have favored cooperation between the two ministries. In his time, Shevardnadze raised the formula of "model relations" with the republic ministries. It is true that, in practice, this was not always the case. Now, the new minister has confirmed the line of "model relations." I must say that, in principle, all problems are totally solvable, for both the Russian and the Union ministries agree that differences in views and the coordination of views are both natural.

The fact that the legacy of the totalitarian thinking has led to an improper understanding of the very concept of "coordination" is a different matter. By this, in our country, we understand leveling off, and when it becomes a question of relations among republics, "unitarism." From my viewpoint, the principle of coordination does not exclude independent actions by republics and nuances in approaches. Yet there have been strange cases.... For example, the Russian minister of foreign affairs goes to Washington where he meets with Secretary of State Baker. Naturally, he reports his impressions to Moscow. One could dispute the worth of his information, that is one thing I understand, but in any case the minister clearly relies on the fact that it will make its way not only to Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs but, above all, also to the RSFSR leadership. What happened, in fact, was that my information was received by the high Union leadership but did not reach Yeltsin.

[Razuvayev] Last autumn, a young brilliant diplomat, head of a Union Ministry administration, decided to change his complacent, tranquil and, from the viewpoint of many people, exceptionally attractive position, for the rather dangerous post in terms of his career (let us call things by their right names) of minister of foreign affairs of the RSFSR. Have you ever regretted this choice over the past months?

[Kozyrev] I did not question its rightness from the very beginning, nor do I question it now. Naturally, my preceding position had its tangible advantages. But when I think of how I would hurt had I failed to agree to switch to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had I refused this opportunity to make use of my professional skills to help Russia finally begin to live according to civilized standards.... No, the question is not one of the advantages offered by one position or another. The difference between them is that in my present position my conscience bothers me less.

Turkmen Foreign Affairs Minister on External Policies

91US0430A *Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 14 Mar 91 p 3*

[Interview with Avdy Kuliyeu, Turkmen SSR minister of foreign affairs and member of the Presidential Council, by I. Ivakhnenko; place and date not given: "I Love To Seek Out the Truth"]

[Text] It was very difficult speaking with this man. He did not simply sidestep any of the sharp or even "sensational" judgments and assessments, but was extremely careful in his choice of words and restrained in expressing his personal attitudes. In short, this kind of interviewee is difficult for a journalist. On the other hand these qualities are perhaps simply essential for a diplomat, Turkmen SSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the Presidential Council Avdy Kuliyeu.

[Ivakhnenko] Avdy Ovezovich, it has only recently become possible to talk about the activity of the republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From the moment that Turkmenistan proclaimed its sovereignty. How do you see the republic's foreign policy?

[Kuliyeu] To start with, let us collate our terms. Sovereignty is that political status of a state in which its leadership is totally free in its choice and adoption of decisions. Whether this affects the domestic life of the area or its mutual relations with the other Union republics and with foreign states. So that this kind of understanding of sovereignty is fully inscribed in the concept of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union. For the very existence of our federation is a not unimportant factor in an independent foreign policy for Turkmenistan. I think that it is understandable that a sovereign state (republic) that is part of a powerful Union elicits more respect than one that acts in isolation.

We are firmly determined to "warm up" relations with neighboring states—Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan. They are countries on whose land hundreds of thousands of our brother Turkmens live. They are countries with which we are close historically in terms of culture, traditions, and way of life. And incidentally, establishing good relations with them will in turn be in line with the effective nature of the "eastern" and "southern" foreign policy of the entire Soviet Union. But whereas a common past may bring us significantly closer to these states, there are countries with which relations still lie in the future. What I have in mind is the group of highly developed Western powers. Without contacts with them we will be simply unable to achieve a "permanent passport" in the world house of the community of nations. And without this it is even more impossible to integrate ourselves into the international economic system and become a coparticipant in progress.

[Ivakhnenko] What role will your department play in all these processes?

[Kuliyeu] We must make these goals realistic and carry the idea from the plane of office planning to life. The milestones on this road will be the Turkmen SSR missions at Soviet embassies in the countries I have named. Turkmenia's cultural trade centers that will soon appear abroad should also help. The staff of our ministry has been increased by 25 people put at the disposal of the president of the republic. This indicates a significant increase in the number of problems on which the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working. I admit

that our colleagues abroad will be mainly oriented on establishing business contacts, looking for potential partners, and recruiting local businessmen for republic projects. The motive for selecting this model of foreign policy is to provide for the economic interests of the republic. Our goal is to ensure that the scheme—buying profitably and selling profitably—never misfires in foreign trade. This is by no means mercantilism. Under market conditions when it is necessary to count increasingly only on oneself, an effective foreign trade policy for us—in general a raw materials republic—becomes almost the only way to move ahead. In other words, the task even becomes geopolitical in nature. And that is no exaggeration. We remember the example of Japan and other economic "giants" of the Far East—small states, sometimes diminutive—which, acting exclusively by economic methods, have achieved the kind of influence that even a victorious war rarely brings.

Returning to our own land, I note that even the rudimentary development of direct links with foreign state brings colossal benefit. How did Turkmenistan carry out trade with Iran? Goods were shipped to the center and were then forwarded to the addressee. The transport costs made this kind of trade almost prohibitive. Today we are managing without creating these difficulties, and this means that efforts can be directed not toward dealing with them but rather toward more meaningful goals. Perhaps this example is too simple, but it does convey quite accurately the state of affairs in their earlier form and in their altered form. An agreement of mutual understanding was recently signed between the Turkmenistan and Iranian ministries of foreign affairs. It was the first agreement of its kind to cover not only diplomatic contacts but also aspects of cultural, trade, and economic cooperation. Our links have been strengthened to the extent that agreement has been reached to hold consultations each quarter at ministerial level.

[Ivakhnenko] I have noticed your emphasis on Turkmenistan's foreign policy being at one with the Soviet Union's strategic activity in the world arena in general. Notwithstanding, the situation today is such that the positions of the republic and the center are sometimes in contradiction, as, for example, the conflicts with Russia, Moldova, and the Baltics. What do you think of these disputes, and to whose viewpoint are you closer?

[Kuliyeu] The question is how incompatible are the market and the plan, and how incompatible is republic sovereignty with Union sovereignty? You must understand that the earlier economic links within the country have been severed, so that it turns out to be easier to establish new links abroad. This is the objective reality that will exist until the position in the country itself changes, not by command but actually. There is, however, another aspect of the problem. Yes, the viewpoint does exist that these frictions between the republic and center are the beginning of the end. But what if we look at it differently. A new state mechanism is being created in which the parts are rubbing one against the other and friction really is being created, and sometimes there are

shortcomings and something "flies off," something is replaced and perfected on the run. But! this grinding-in is essential for the mechanism to be adjusted. I believe that it will be adjusted. There is simply no need to get nervous or go to extremes. The pendulum will be set and a common time will be set on the "clocks" in all the republics without having to divide them into those that are "running fast" and those that are "running slow."

[Ivakhnenko] It is people who make policy. To the point, what do you consider yourself to be, a hard man, a soft one, a radical...?

[Kuliyev] There is an old medical precept: do no harm. So I follow the principle of not worsening a situation. A person should make an in-depth study of a situation and weigh all the pros and cons before reaching a decision. And the decision that is reached should only improve the situation, or at least not make it worse. One of the guarantees of making a choice without mistakes is that the activity of a politician should pursue not his own interests but the state interests. Although if they do happen to coincide and move the state toward progress there is nothing wrong with individualism. Of course, it is the result that is important—the good of the country.

[Ivakhnenko] Could you possibly say a few words about your political views and partialities?

[Kuliyev] To put it briefly, I am a patriot. I do not think that the years since 1917 have been a void and a period of social stagnation for our country. There have been triumphs and progress and advance. Over the past decades our people, splintered into tribes, have grown stronger and shaped themselves, and acquired statehood. We have nothing of which to be ashamed in our history. So it sometimes pains me to hear our fellow countrymen vying with each other to disparage the country. If we spend our time venting our malice on the past we cannot give birth to anything good in the future.

[Ivakhnenko] You have mentioned the eternal general categories. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the best indication of a person's inner world is his human passions. What are your passions?

[Kuliyev] I love to learn languages and I try not to lose them, so I am constantly reading literature in Arabic and English. Until recently I used to read many writers—Turkmen, Russian, Soviet, foreign. But now I have stopped believing in some of them. It is very difficult, but I have become seriously disillusioned. I have said that it is painful for me when compatriots take it upon themselves to make general judgments and strike out entire epochs without looking at the essence of things. To affirm a truth without finding out what it is a major sin for writers, who are the teachers of humankind. So doubt took hold of me: Is it possible to trust works of fiction, even giving due allowance for subjectiveness?... Perhaps that is why I am now trying to read more scientific and historical studies. In other words, to dig through to the truth independently.

Nevertheless, there is one writer I still love—Hemingway.

[Ivakhnenko] What is it that you like in his work?

[Kuliyev] Finding the truth. I realize that this sounds vague, but I really like to do this. To extract information, to collect the necessary facts, to consider them and reach some conclusions, to check them, and finally understand: This is the truth. I have found it. That is the only thing that brings satisfaction. In the grand scheme of things, the meaning of any work is the search for truth. Only this makes human life truly fulfilling.

[Ivakhnenko] So what do you not like about your work?

[Kuliyev] Being away from home, from those near and dear to me, this very painful separation from my motherland. For life is one thing, but we pay for it through our search for truth. No other price is acceptable for destiny. But today I am employed in what I like best, and I am in Turkmenistan. For me, this is happiness.

[Ivakhnenko] Your diplomatic career has been abroad. Perhaps you would reveal to TURMKENSKAYA ISKRA readers at least something of the intimacies of our diplomacy.

[Kuliyev] My work abroad has been in the Arab East. At first I dealt with matters pertaining to foreign ties in my country of sojourn, then later its domestic policy. This kind of move in diplomatic work is normal and enables the diplomat to gain a truly comprehensive vision of a country. The work is done both with sources of information and simply with people—citizens of the state from the most varied strata of society. A diplomat must know what forces are operating in the state, the mechanism used for decisionmaking, where the sympathies of the people lie. But I shall probably disappoint you when I tell you that I do not have any special professional secrets. I try to resolve any problem not by dreaming up some original method but in the way that life prompts me to do it. I always try to avoid cunning with the person with whom I am dealing. The results of tricks would be negative. In order to convince an opponent it is necessary to use not cunning but the arguments of reason.

Nevertheless, a main condition for achieving results in the work of a diplomat is also the abstract concept of love. Love for the country in which one lives, and for its people, and a desire to understand and find the "truth" of that country and bring it to one's own country.

[Ivakhnenko] During the period of stagnation your department was quite often accused of disinformation, that is, when the desired was stated as the reality. There were diplomats who did this. Did you?

[Kuliyev] No, never. I do not accept lies to the rescue, the more so since in the grand reckoning this has never saved anything. And unfortunately you are right: Workers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abroad are not always objective when providing information for the center. Putting it in the language normal for a Soviet

person, they engage in "diplomatic account padding." The reason, of course, is not deliberate harm but a desire to see the country of sojourn following our policy.

I reached a clear-cut conclusion for myself. Our diplomacy has a serious defect compared to Western diplomacy. Their style is the businesslike approach. Foreign policy activity is defined by specific interests. And the ambassador himself is something like a company agent. If he provides incorrect information the company will sustain losses and contracts will be lost—the taxpayers' money will simply vanish. Who would tolerate a liar in these circumstances?

Our style, however, is romanticism. We want them to love our country and its ideology and values. And I must admit that there have been no great changes on this plane during the years that we call the perestroika years. "Diplomatic account padding" remains in our work.

President S.A. Niyazov attaches great importance to the republic's international policy and Turkmenistan's links abroad. This is as it should be, for a state's real independence is guaranteed both by pursuing a correct domestic policy and correct foreign policy activity. I am convinced that this attitude is now as irreversible as is the very sovereignty of our motherland.

Ukrainian UN Representative Interviewed

91UF0600A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
14 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian SSR Permanent UN Representative Gennadiy Iosifovich Udovenko by Ukrinform Correspondent N. Maslov, under the rubric: "UkSSR Permanent Representative to the UN": "A New Period of Activity"]

[Text] The UkSSR Permanent Mission to the United Nations issued a proclamation of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine in a qualitatively new period of its activity. Ukrinform Correspondent N. Maslov talked with Ukrainian SSR Permanent UN Representative G.I. Udovenko on the specific features of the work of Ukrainian diplomats in this largest international organization and also in the country where it is located—the United States of America.

[Maslov] First of all, I would like to take advantage of this moment to congratulate you on your new post, Gennadiy Iosifovich. In accordance with the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers resolution, the ample and responsible rank of Republic Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has been added to your title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. What does this fact represent?

[Udovenko] First of all, this signifies an increase of the status of the UkSSR permanent UN representative. It provides greater independence in the resolution of issues that are connected with our republic's interests in the community of nations and expands the capabilities for

action of its diplomatic mission abroad. The rank of deputy minister permits me to make decisions locally, independently and, therefore, more efficiently on issues that previously had to be mandatorily coordinated with the center. Naturally, this does not exclude mutual coordination and also the provision of detailed information to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the steps taken.

So, let us say, if an urgent session of the Security Council is convened at which the interests of the Ukrainian SSR may be directly affected, then in the new capacity of deputy minister I can locally decide about Ukraine's participation in the session of this main UN organ. Furthermore, one of our mission's most important tasks consists of rendering comprehensive assistance to the expansion of trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and the United States. I often have to deal with representatives of U.S. business circles. Now, when they learn that the meeting will occur on the deputy minister of foreign affairs level, this immediately eliminates a multitude of problems.

I also want to stress this nuance: The designation of Ukraine's permanent representative as deputy minister of foreign affairs occurred at the initiative of the Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is evidence that our government intends to pay particular attention to participation in the United Nations in light of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine. This document, along with the recently adopted Republic Supreme Soviet resolution on Ukraine's foreign policy activities is a very important directive for our activities at the UN.

Clearly the work of the permanent mission is carried out under the direct guidance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, we maintain broad contacts with other Republic ministries and departments, submit our proposals to the government and UkSSR Supreme Soviet, and promote the establishment of business contacts of individual Ukrainian and U.S. organizations in the sphere of trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation and also to expand cultural ties with our fellow countrymen abroad.

For several years now, the republic's permanent mission has been actively participating in the practical implementation of a very important project. The question is one of rendering assistance to children who are victims of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The latest meeting just took place between representatives of the leadership of the American Aid to the Children of Chernobyl Fund and Zenon and Nadezhda Matkivkiy. With them, I looked into the issues of future development of cooperation with the Ukrainian Diaspora to render assistance to the victims of Chernobyl, first of all to the children, and also into the solution of problems to improve our population's medical service. One more example of specific cooperation with sector departments is aid to the "Krasnyy rezinshchik" Plant

leadership on the establishment of a joint venture for production of surgical gloves in the United States.

There are also completely new directions in the mission's activities. So, Mstislav, Patriarch of Kiev and all Rus and Metropolitan of the Autocephalic Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the United States, requested that we assist him to consolidate the church's position. For our part, we are submitting a series of proposals on this issue to the republic government.

Naturally, our most important mission is to defend Ukraine's political, economic, and ecological interests in the main forum of international society, in the General Assembly, and in other UN organs. Meanwhile, few people know that today we are actually simultaneously fulfilling the functions of the Ukrainian Embassy to the United States. In this role, right now we are working on how to insure the greatest effectiveness of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet Chairman's visit to the United States.

[Maslov] How did the proclamation of the Ukrainian Declaration on its state sovereignty and the change of status of its permanent UN representative affect mutual relations with the USSR and Belorussian representatives and what new things have appeared in relations with them?

[Udovenko] Relations with the Soviet missions and, in particular, with my colleagues Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent USSR Representative to the UN Vorontsov and with Belorussian SSR Permanent Representative G. Buravkin are very trusting and amicable. Immediately after adoption of the Declaration by the republic parliament, I officially handed them copies of the document and proposed that we be guided by its provisions in our future relations. They perceived this proposal with complete understanding.

We are continuing to work together in many directions. This concerns first of all the problems of Chernobyl. Recently the three of us paid a visit to the UN Secretary General during the course of which we informed him about the steps being taken to implement the General Assembly decision on overcoming the consequences of the accident at the ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant] and exchanged thoughts on the community of nations' future steps in this direction. After the meeting, we sent the appropriate proposals for review in Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk.

The question is often heard in our Supreme Soviet and also during the course of meetings with Ukrainian parliamentarians and representatives of society who have visited the United States: "What does Ukraine have from membership in the UN?" To be perfectly frank, it discourages me. On the one hand, the Declaration on State Sovereignty states the aspiration to establish direct diplomatic relations with foreign countries and for participation in the Helsinki All-European process. On the other hand, doubt about the benefit of our participation in the community of nations arises among some people.

Membership in the UN serves as the most authoritative confirmation that international society recognizes us as a sovereign state. While using the rostrum of the UN, we can defend our own national interests or strive to get these interests considered in international affairs. For example, the permanent mission became the initiator of the review of the issue on ecological safety and to increase cooperation of countries in the sphere of ecology at the UN General Assembly session. This is an example of how we use the UN rostrum for a comprehensive solution of not only our own but also of the most urgent global problems.

[Maslov] How do you assess the recent decision of the U.S. Administration to render direct assistance to the Baltic republics and Ukraine in the form of shipments of medical supplies?

[Udovenko] Any aid must be purposeful. And I advocate that aid not be some sort of amorphous thing so that it is sent not just anywhere, but to a specific republic. Moreover, we have now received lists of orphanages and hospitals which indicate what specific equipment and medicines they need. Now, when we turn to U.S. social organizations, we suggest that they make direct contact. That is why President G. Bush's decision is, to some degree, a response to our having posed the question. During official meetings in Washington, we talked about the desirability of direct contacts.

I think it is not worth excessively politicizing this issue. On the contrary, we must encourage a differentiated approach with the understanding that this is not promoting the disintegration of the union but it is permitting more effective use of the assistance being offered.

In this regard, I would like to point out that the American press has now begun a wave of sharp criticism as a result of the decision of the USSR Ministry of Public Health and the World Health Organization [WHO] to establish a center in Obninsk to study the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant]. We are receiving dozens of letters with protests which are also directed to all countries who are members of the UN. The general director of WHO received a similar message. It raises the question: Why is the scientific center to study the aftereffects of the Chernobyl accident being established near Moscow and not near Chernobyl? In the opinions of the letters authors, this fact is evidence that the center is making decisions while being guided by some reason of its own that far from everyone understands. It is no coincidence that, at meetings with us, representatives of the Ukrainian Diaspora express strong concern with regard to the fact that the aid they are rendering is not going where it has been designated to go. We are not bypassing this wave of protest and we are striving to disseminate our own point of view to the appropriate union ministries and departments.

[Maslov] Recently, signals have begun to arrive from American subscribers to Ukrainian newspapers and magazines that they are receiving practically none of the

publications they subscribe to. They say that this is the result of difficulties that have arisen with paper and also with postal deliveries, whose cost recently sharply increased in the United States. However, Ukrainian Americans want to know more about events in the Ukraine in greater detail. What is being done to fill this information shortage?

[Udovenko] The Ukrainian permanent mission regularly sends out its own press releases to public organizations and to the mass media which have expressed the desire to receive them. We maintain contacts with a number of new publications, for example, such as UKRAINIAN DIGEST REVIEW, a commercial bulletin that is published at the facilities of the Ukrainian Institute of America.

For now unfortunately we do not have the facilities for broad dissemination of our own articles in the American mass press. This is one of the reasons why people know so little about Ukraine in the United States.

[Maslov] Today, many people are talking and writing about consolidating the healthy forces of the Ukrainian nation. Unfortunately, the facts are evidence that our fellow countrymen and blood brothers do not always turn out to be persons holding similar views and frequently they also simply harm the cause of the restoration of Ukraine. How do you see this problem from the position of a veteran of the Ukrainian diplomatic service?

[Udovenko] We are actively participating in the processes of expanding contacts with the Ukrainian Diaspora. Just several days ago, I met with its representatives at the Scientific Society imeni Taras Shevchenko. A day

earlier, we had a conversation with Vasiliy Losten, bishop of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church. Syracuse University Professor Doctor Gvozda, president of the Worldwide Association of Ukrainian Peoples, visited the permanent mission for the first time. Just this one short list talks not only about the full activities of the UkSSR mission but also about the fact that increasingly broad strata of the Ukrainian Diaspora are turning to us.

There certainly are other circles that openly oppose cooperation with Soviet Ukraine, especially with its state representatives. Nevertheless, we are observing the enormous interest of the overwhelming majority of American Ukrainians in the events which are occurring in the land of their ancestors. They are expressing a burning desire to help us in our current difficult time. There are also major entrepreneurs among them, such as Georgiy Yurchishin, former vice-president of Boston Bank and currently head of a major trading company. He is traveling to Ukraine in the next few days where he will meet with members of our government. He intends to discuss issues associated with large-scale investments in Ukraine's economy. An agreement was recently signed on cooperation to train specialists in the area of management between Kiev International Institute of Management and Fordham University, New York.

The first meeting between the official representatives of Ukraine with Yuriy Shimko, president of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (SKVU), recently took place. We are moving toward such contacts. Regular meetings with Patriarch Mstislav, dean of the Greco-Catholic Cathedral of St. Yuriy by Father Pashchak, and with other religious figures recently became traditional. This is graphic evidence that we are directing our efforts toward consolidating Ukrainian forces for the sake of promoting positive processes.

Coverage of Currency Scandals Queried

91UF0592A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Feofanov: "What Goes Into the Trash Can and Who Goes Behind Bars?"]

[Text] We were offered a fascinating new show. The employees of institutions that are supposed to monitor the law discussed the 140 billion rubles. And it is even more money—the figures are approaching the trillions. It seems that either mafia cooperatives or the legal government of a sovereign state have moved abroad all the cash and non-cash money existing in the country. But, listening to the details of the "case" as stated on television, you begin to calm down—it seems that no one has yet had time to move anything anywhere. It even seems that they have not yet managed to complete the contemplated astronomically huge theft of property. As you listen to the details you begin to wonder, together with the investigator incidentally, "Did anything happen at all?" Because it is suggested on television that all these investigations may very well be thrown "into the trash can."

But then, whether you want to or not, you begin to ask the question: In that case why were we presented with this entire show? To attract viewers in the spirit of the "new direction" that has been declared in television broadcasting? To advertise the indefatigable vigilance of those "organs" conducting the fight against organized crime? In order to respond to the insistent demands of "the people" to talk about the famous case? In general, all three reasons serve to justify the television show. And if it was journalists, who are supposed to be aware of the presumption of innocence, that broadcast this show, one can only lament their legal ignorance and justify them in terms of the nature of their profession—to deliver sensational material as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, legally trained employees of the USSR Procuracy spoke before the country, employees who, incidentally, so heatedly defended "secrets of the investigation" from persistent journalists.

It is not difficult to guess that the games around the "case of the 140 billion," like those of the "ANT [Automation, Science, and Technology] case," have a purely political motive. Well, as many thinkers assure us, you cannot turn a politician into a silk purse. So be it. But something else troubles me: As a result of political motives they will find it easy to throw the "case" they have begun "into the trash can," and they may send someone to jail for the same motives. No, calm down, Silayev and even Filshin are hardly threatened by this—this type of illegal witch hunt only threatens, as they say, common people. And justice itself, which is only just standing on its feet.

Soon after the television show I have described, on 27 March to be exact, a "Vremya" broadcast informed us that the criminal investigation department and state security had rendered the latest groups of racketeers harmless: Nukhayev, Atlangiriyev, and Labzhanidze—two Chechens and a Georgian. So quickly was this

reported across the entire country in a number of the most important publications, that one might suppose a powerful criminal syndicate had been uncovered. However, it seems that is not the case. They are accused of only one crime, which did not involve a knife to the throat or an iron to some other part of the body. Two days prior to that I was visited by the brother of one of those convicted by the capital's Moskvoretskiy Rayon People's Court, incidentally a lawyer by education. He told me that the accused had not confessed, the accusation had not been proven, that his brother had an alibi, that the manager of the sausage shop from whom he had supposedly extorted money made a statement about events that had happened a year later, etc. I answered that newspapers should not interfere in justice, especially when the sentence had not yet been decided.

"But after all, the press pronounced its sentence before the trial," the brother of the "racketeer" said to me. "Look at the newspapers. You see 'Chechen mafia' everywhere. They have convicted the Chechens simply because they are Chechens. It is the same thing as in the United Kingdom with the 'Birmingham six' that your newspaper reported on."

These were the words of a man who was interested in the fate of someone close to him. Nonetheless, I talked with lawyers and looked through the press. On 30 September SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA printed "Blood Money"—The fighters Khozha and Ruslan (the pseudonyms of the convicted) were recruiting for a criminal "Chechen society." MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 25 September—"recently arrested leaders of a 'Chechen society.'" My own paper No. 241 (1990)—a "Chechen society." You cannot find fault with any of these articles separately. But did a "criminal Chechen society" really exist? And does not all this influence the court? And the main thing: Is it moral or politic to introduce an ethnic motif into justice—a "Chechen society" or an "Uzbek mafia"?

Incidentally, about the reference to the "Birmingham six": A year ago I was in the United Kingdom and wrote five enthusiastic articles for IZVESTIYA about British justice. Talking with British journalists, I more than once heard, "Our courts are not perfect, but they have begun to lend an ear to the verdicts of the international European court on specific cases." With the obligatory proviso: "Except for the cases of Irish terrorists." At the time I did not attach any special significance to these provisos: The country was agitated and alarmed by terrorist acts and deaths, and the people demanded decisive action from the authorities. And now there has been a recent report: Six completely innocent people spent 16 years in jail. No matter what one's interest in the fate of the brother of the man I talked to, I could not refute his comparison of the sentence of the "Chechen mafia" to the sentence of the "Irish terrorists."

I cannot in any fashion judge the justice or the injustice of the conviction of the Moskvoretskiy Rayon Court of our capital. But I cannot understand how the investigative services can declare the guilt of people to the entire

country on television when there has not even been a legal sentencing. You cannot just throw that statement in the trash can—the people are already behind bars.

Through a complete coincidence, our parliament was discussing a draft bill on the USSR Supreme Court on that same day, 27 March. The connecting theme in the debates was the idea of the independence of the court as a fundamental principle of a rule-of-law state. They argued about whether to include the statement "instructions of the USSR Supreme Court are obligatory for all courts." They decided that this was nonetheless pressure and that "obligatory" must be excluded. What subtleties!

Meanwhile, in parallel fashion, not in the hall of the parliament but among an audience measuring a hundred million, there is open pressure on a court which still must evaluate the legality of a sentence... An investigation of the "case of the 140 billion" is underway, no formal elements of a crime are so far perceptible, and yet a criminal shadow has been cast on the government of a sovereign republic.

This is how we are building a rule-of-law state. In the halls of parliaments and in theoretical investigations we erect rule-of-law edifices, and then in the dust of populist passions we tear it all down. How, I ask myself, are our poor people supposed to feel respect for the law and a sense of its stability in these fights?

Plans To Review Private Foreign Trade Activity Criticized

91UF0647A Tallinn VECHErNIY TALLINN
in Russian 1 Mar 91 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled article]

[Text] As of the end of 1990, 1,715 joint enterprises [SP's], 2,516 cooperatives, and 4,014 other non-state owned enterprises in Russia had the right to independently conduct foreign economic operations.

On the whole, commercial entities in Russia—participants in foreign economic relations (VES)—comprise 55.8 percent of the total VES participants in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

According to the information coming from the Russian Ministry of Finance, there is a plan to conduct in March an inspection of financial results of commercial activities of entities that participate in VES. This inspection will be conducted over the entire territory of Russia and will affect all—without exception—commercial entities. At the same time, state enterprises that participate in VES will not be subject to inspection.

The main purpose of the inspection is to uncover violations of foreign trade legislation, illegal hard currency income, and VES participant contributions to the republic and state budgets, as well as irregularities in

accounting and record-keeping practices. The omnipresent newspaper *COMMERSANT* found out from the RSFSR Ministry of Finance that not only import-export deals, but all foreign economic operations of the VES participants will be subject to inspection. Special attention is supposed to be paid to financial relations between the Soviet and foreign SP founders. In particular, the inspection is supposed to establish whether the size and timing of the founders' contributions to the SP charter capital are in compliance with the stated charter rules.

Inspection services are directed to collect information on the average monthly pay of enterprise employees, including top management and administrative-managerial personnel.

According to available information, the inspection organs will also pay special attention to uncovering incidents of transporting over the USSR state border goods or other property without submitting the freight customs declaration or discrepancies between the information stated in the declaration and the goods actually shipped.

The validity of the calculation of prices of goods and services being exported and imported by the enterprise also will be carefully studied. In case of doubt in the validity of the calculation, enterprises will have to prove that they have not sold goods abroad at reduced prices and that they have not paid more than the world price for the goods they imported.

In the opinion of specialists, it is always possible to prove—if necessary—that export-import operations were conducted on the basis of unjustified prices. Thus, the very right of commercial entities, including SPs, to establish foreign trade prices on its goods and services is being questioned.

Besides the validity of foreign trade prices, the validity of establishing USSR retail and wholesale prices for selling imported goods on the Soviet market will also be investigated.

Special attention will be paid to compliance with the rules and procedures for keeping financial documentation in receiving, keeping, and using foreign currency in 1990 and the relevant accounting period of 1991. Enterprises will have to substantiate the expenditures of hard currency from both the balance sheet and the operating accounts in the USSR State Bank for Foreign Economic Relations for purchases of equipment, materials, consumer goods, foreign trips of enterprise employees, and entertainment.

In cases where violations of financial discipline are uncovered, the RSFSR Ministry of Finance prescribes, with reference to the Union legislation, that the inspection organs fine the persons responsible for theft or shortage of the freely convertible currency in the amount that is double the inflicted losses (in rubles calculated at a special exchange rate of the USSR State Bank on the date when the violation occurred).

Experts believe that this planned inspection of the activities of Russian VES participants may be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the Russian Government to carry out in practice its regulatory functions in the area of foreign trade operations. It is also possible that there is a hope that as a result of the inspection the republic budget coffers will receive a new injection that will support the work of the republic foreign economic entities, first of all the Bank for Foreign Trade of Russia.

SOME OBSERVERS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THE BASIS OF THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE'S PLAN TO CONDUCT AN INSPECTION OF THE FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN VES PARTICIPANTS RESTS ON A MORE THAN BANAL FOUNDATION, NAMELY, THE LONG-ESTABLISHED WARM RELATIONSHIP OF FORMER COLLEAGUES—CURRENT ACTING MINISTER OF FINANCE OF RUSSIA PAVEL LAZAREV, AND FORMER USSR MINISTER OF FINANCE VALENTIN PAVLOV. IN THE OPINION OF THE EXPERTS, THIS INSPECTION IS COMPLETELY IN LINE WITH THE DIRECTION OF THE NEW PRIME MINISTER'S ACTIVITIES.

ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, FOREIGN TRADE SPECIALISTS—BOTH THEORISTS AND PRACTITIONERS—ALL AGREE THAT THE INSPECTION PLANNED FOR RUSSIA FOR THIS SPRING MAY BE DESCRIBED AS COMPLETELY IN LINE WITH THE UNION GOVERNMENT COURSE TOWARDS TIGHTENING THE REINS UNDER WHICH COMMERCIAL ENTITIES CONDUCT THEIR FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITIES.

Foreign Aid, Investment Linked to Western Self-Interest

91UF0630A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 11 Jan 91 p 5

[Article by Ye. Gudkov, member of the department of military-economic and military-political research of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations and candidate of economic sciences, under the rubric "Opinion of an Expert": "Western Aid. What Should We Count On?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Yevgeniy Timofeyevich Gudkov is a graduate of the geographic faculty of Moscow State University in the sub-faculty of political geography of capitalist and developing countries. Now he works in the department of military-economic and military-political research of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations and is a candidate of economic sciences.

Today the very principle of the reconstruction of a market as the basis of the effective operation of the economy can hardly be disputed. Especially since the chief argument for such a reconstruction is the entire history of civilization, inseparably connected with the constant improvement of market relations.

The problem lies elsewhere. Almost all who favor a quick transition to a market economy link it with the need to receive aid from the developed capitalist states. Moreover, "Western aid" regularly appears as the second most important factor (after transition to market relations) in all official and unofficial documents dedicated to the problems of perestroika. And this aid is supposed to consist of not only moral, administrative, or technical assistance but also of financial "infusions" into our economy, primarily through the receipt of loans and credits in hard currency.

Such aid really is needed, but the role which is assigned to it in the processes of perestroika should be thought out, it seems to me, more carefully.

Upon what do our politicians and scholars base their euphoric, one might say, confidence that, despite all the complexities, aid, including financial aid, will be given to us? Let us be guided by common sense and say openly who the "we" are that "the West will help," or at least is supposedly preparing to help, and in the name of what the West will do this!

So far as one may judge, there are at least two important factors "feeding" the confidence that Western aid will be received.

First, there exists a certain conviction that it is in the interests of the West to deal in the world community with a Soviet Union that is stable in political relations and prosperous in economic relations.

Second, many economic scholars insist on the unquestionable ability of the West to grant us large-scale economic aid, fervently believing in the further crisis-free development of the Western economy. It is assumed that capitalism has already worked out sufficiently effective mechanisms for resolving their own problems, including the ability to avert economic, political, raw materials, and any other crises. Such crisis-free development, in their opinion, guarantees us the receipt of quite significant aid inasmuch as in this event everything depends exclusively on us and on how we blend into a "civilized" community.

If one could count 100 percent on all these factors, then all sources of disagreement would be exhausted and all the "unbelievers" would have nothing left to do but look upon the process of the restoration of the Soviet (or would it no longer be Soviet?) economy with enthusiasm. However, even those processes which are taking place today offer many reasons to doubt the real "workability" of the aforementioned factors, without even mentioning the need for a proper evaluation of the influence on perestroika of those processes that may arise in the near future.

Let us begin with a fact that is well known and which no one is concealing: The West will never render us aid unless it is to their own profit. And this profit is hardly limited merely to the achievement of a position whereby

the threat to the West of the Soviet Union is sharply reduced. Such a threat is virtually reduced to zero even today.

But, beyond that, the West wishes to have real and tangible economic profit if not today then at the end of fairly short period of time. It wishes to create in the USSR socioeconomic structures that will favor its further expansion.

Evaluating the economic situation in our country at the present and over the near future, the West does not see any real opportunities for receiving such profits, with the exception of a case whereby the USSR finally assumes the role of a third-rate power trading in its chief national wealth—territory and natural resources as well as intellect and spiritual culture.

Those crumbs which **they are supposedly promising us at present** do not constitute a windfall. The United States, for example, is declaring openly that the economic situation there is such that they cannot presently sign checks worth billions of dollars. Have we really learned nothing from the example of Poland, initially promised almost 10 billion, which eventually turned into 100 million?!

From what we presently know, it is possible to reach conclusions about the possibility of our receiving about \$20 billion over the next several years, or \$4-5 billion annually. Perhaps that would not be such a small amount if all this capital, or the lion's share of it, went to renew the production base. However, the overwhelming majority of the money will go for purchases from capitalist states of food, goods of light industry, etc. That is, the wealth from this capital will not help us but rather worsen our position inasmuch as by the time deliveries on the basis of these loans end, our own production base will be in complete disorganization. After all, we are doing anything and everything but reconstructing the production base. In addition to that, there are also "objective" circumstances: The Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] lists still have not been destroyed and access to modern technologies is closed to us.

Today the FRG is promising us about \$8 billion, or even more. That is today. But who can ensure that a sovereign state, having no real or even paper obligations to us after finally laying to rest World War II, will invest many billions into our economy when it has its own concerns, as they say, "up to here." And not only within the country but also within the EEC, which will have a need for those German billions.

In addition, a significant portion of even these 8 billion will go back to the FRG inasmuch as construction of housing will be carried out by German, and primarily former GDR, construction people. That is, the FRG's aid to us is in some fashion aid to itself in terms of the relaxation of social tension resulting from the increase in unemployment on the territory of the former GDR.

The conditions under which France agreed to grant us loans in the amount of about \$1 billion also put one on one's guard. After all, it is no accident that shares in the loan that France granted at one time to tsarist Russia went up. And for the time being no one knows how we will return that billion before long.

As for joint ventures in the USSR, their role has been graphically revealed. As PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK reported, our country has registered "more than 2,000 joint ventures with a total company capital of about 5 billion rubles... But there is every reason to supposed that the real total of company capital that has been brought in is five to six times less than indicated in the founding documents. According to some foreign estimates (Soviet statistics do not account for separate real investments), the contribution of foreigners is estimated at 10-15 percent of the amount that was initially stated."

On the whole, one may say that all "Western aid" is of a "targeted" nature and cannot under any circumstances assist us in renewing our basic production base, without which there is no sense in talking about any kind of economy or any kind of market.

Incidentally, about the market. In our country many people say that a market is not a bazaar or even a market in the classic sense but a strictly regulated process where the very exchange of goods and the prices on them are under strict control. The control is carried out at the world level using various international mechanisms which, properly, also ensure the relative stability of the present capitalist market.

However, we have ignored one feature of the modern capitalist market which to a great degree explains what is happening on our domestic market today. Indeed, this feature lies at the surface, and very many foreign entrepreneurs speak about it openly.

One of the latest statements of it that I am familiar with belongs to Mr. Satosi Ono, chief representative of the corporation Toyota Tsuse in Moscow. In an interview published in the newspaper KRASNYY VOIN, he said, "The art of the market policy of entrepreneurs consists precisely of evoking demand for certain goods where, it would seem, it cannot exist."

These words express a basic feature of today's market—the modern capitalist market is formed consciously and with a target in mind, and it is formed even there where it cannot exist if that is necessary to a producer of goods who occupies a significant place in the world economy.

In our country there are no such producers (besides the raw materials sectors) and, as a result, for the present we have what we already have, and it will constantly expand and deepen in the future. To grant significant freedom to capitalist enterprises, to ensure guarantees for the security of their activities, to grant territory, etc., etc. will only lead to one thing—Western business is forming and will form in the future their **own** market on our territory,

and it will discard onto that market things that profit it and that do not in any way take into account the interests of our market.

In other words, we wish to join a "civilized" community with our own market relations, whose state and form have lagged many decades behind those relations that rule on the world market today. Everyone, in my opinion, should be able to see what awaits us in that event. And there is not need to go far for examples.

We simply cannot physically master the quantity of different computers (outdated models, for the most part) which have poured into our country today in a mighty stream. There are still no statistics on it, but practice show that the majority of them are used, to put it mildly, not as they are designed but for the most primitive tasks. Most often they are simply used for the trade and financial intrigues that our mass media are constantly uncovering.

We stubbornly do not wish to notice this sort of process of development of the "market," although there already exist a mass of examples of how capitalist entrepreneurs behave on "our" market.

Dennis Collins, director of the center for training and marketing of the Chicago "Board of Trade," has openly talked about the fact that we need to accept Western market "game rules," including those of the exchange market. Discussing the problems of the creation of a Soviet commodities exchange, he said, "It is understood that there is no talk of altruistic motives. We simply want your exchanges to become equal partners one fine day, and we want them to accept the 'game rules' upon which the entire civilized word constructs its economy." (IZVESTIYA)

But, as I have already noted, the entire "civilized" world constructs its economy on its so-called market "game rules" by way of establishing the market even where it cannot exist. And, entering the world market, we inevitably will have to accept these "game rules," according to which we will be assigned a role for the next 100 years of a territory upon which the leading capitalist companies will form solely and exclusively their own market. And, naturally, it will be primarily for profit, a very significant one, for themselves.

This is still only one side of the question, a side that presupposes at least the presence in the West of capital which it can (and supposedly intends to) invest in the economy of the USSR. But what if such capital does not appear? What of those accounts that discuss how, in two to three years (and in light of the current crisis in the Near East, perhaps sooner), the economy of the West will enter a period of protracted and perhaps quite deep crises? Where will the West find the capital to help us then? It is possible that the West will itself seek capital elsewhere in order to patch up the holes in its own economy.

The generally accepted point of view on the appearance of crises in a capitalist economy is well known—the economy "overheats" as a result of the overproduction of goods and the overaccumulation of capital. Numerous means are used for eliminating such an "overheating," including restructuring of the economy and renewal of the underlying production base. So long as signs of such an "overheating" are absent, there is no danger of a crisis. This, properly speaking, is what forms the basis of our present notion that capitalism has achieved a crisis-free phase of development.

But a directly opposite point of view also exists: Under conditions of a capitalist economy there appears at certain times an acute need to carry out a restructuring of basic production and renew the entire production base on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology, and to convert the capital itself into something new. In this fashion monopolistic capital was replaced by state-monopolistic capital, and the latter, in turn, was replaced by transnational capital. And precisely the beginning of such a restructuring is the result of the entry of a capitalist economy into a period of crises. When major repairs on a house are carried out before the residents of the house have moved out, then it is necessary for some time to live "out of suitcases" and feed and clothe oneself as best one can using whatever is lying closest.

Today a process of forming regional groups of capitalist states which ensures the free "transfusion" of capital into these regions is underway. It is leading to a situation whereby corporations making use of the capital of several states, not corporations of individual states for the most part, are becoming the leading corporations in the transnational groupings. Appropriately, provision for the activities of such corporations on the world market is also supported by the efforts of whole groups of states, which increases their opportunities and security.

From this it follows that the essence of the next transition period consists of the fact that henceforth the interstate-transnational form of concentration of capital will become the ruling form in the capitalist world, and corporations that belong to such groupings will begin to determine all market policy within the framework of the world economy.

Proof of the beginning of a transition to a new form of concentration of capital is the desire for the complete elimination of customs barriers between the countries of the EEC, similar efforts by the United States in regard to Canada and Mexico, and Japan's attempts to form an Asian-Pacific Ocean regional community

All of this also leads to the fact that one should expect in the near future the entry of the capitalist economy into a period of prolonged and deep crises.

Taking all of this into account, one may state that the approaching period of crises may turn out to be a very unpleasant event for the capitalist system, but not a fatal

one. At the least, over 200 years of intensive development capitalism has genuinely learned to overcome its own difficulties (in part by observing and drawing conclusions from the experiment of the Russian revolution). But, in particular, not by achieving the phase of "crisis-free" development that we count on in expectation of "aid," but by working out mechanisms for overcoming states of crisis.

But such mechanisms, however new they may be, do not in any fashion stipulate rendering major economic aid at such moments to whomever. Especially to countries which, with numerous stipulations, they continue to view as potential enemies or at least as not deserving the rewards of allies.

One can, of course, completely reject the reality of the situation I have described, but at the minimum such a step would be hasty. In addition, all of our well-known programs are oriented toward the fact that we will be very firmly bound to world economic structures and in our own fashion will begin to enter the world market with our own market relations in two to three years; that is, the possibility exists that it will be at a period that is quite unfavorable for the world economy.

Being completely unused to activities under conditions of the world's capitalist market, with its harsh laws of survival and at a time of world economic crisis, we will find ourselves in the role not just of a "whipping boy." They will open us wide, strip us, and send us out into the world as complete economic and political bankrupts.

And at that time it will not be proper to accuse the West of being so "bad." That is its style of life, its means of existence, the way it survives. The West simply cannot act any other way. Why should it change the direction of its own activities when its whole past experience speaks in favor precisely of the direction it has chosen? Therefore we need to count **solely and exclusively** on our own forces. We should not view Western aid as a panacea for all misfortunes and as one of the chief factors contributing to implementation of the processes of perestroika.

Western aid should be viewed only as a standby, an additional source which may exist and may not exist. In the event of the latter case, there should not be any "fatal" consequences for perestroika. In no event should we put it, "aid," at the top of the list. This is so that, on one hand, we do not unfairly blame our neighbors in the world community simply because of their "harsh" nature, with which we are familiar in general and, on the other hand, so that we do not end up worse off than before, largely as a result of our own inability to work under conditions of a market.

Today our desire to enter the "civilized" community is becoming increasingly strong. But not at any price!

We tried to build a society that had never existed. Now we intend to build a society that no longer exists. At the very least we are trying today to enter a community whose value orientations do not even suit those who live

in it. Moreover, we are trying to do it with the help of the market—our notions of the market are at least 100 years behind the times and the market itself is standing on the threshold of a new qualitative change. There simply will be no place in a renewed world market for us unless we earn it **ourselves**.

Questions About ANT Tank Sale Remain Unanswered

91UF0608A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Mar 91 Union edition p 3

[Article by Nikolay Andreyev and Aleksandr Protsenko: "ANT [Automation Science and Technology]. One Year Later"]

[Text] "Vladimir Igorevich, what was your rank in the KGB?"

"I started as a warrant officer and left as senior lieutenant of state security," Ryashentsev said.

That same Ryashentsev, from ANT....

IZVESTIYA discussed this topic one year ago; on 27 March in Moscow and on 28 March throughout the country, the newspaper published a conversation with A.S. Systsov, USSR minister of aviation industry. The topic of the discussion was the scandal surrounding ANT. At that time, it was only beginning to gather strength. Everything began, as we know, with the observation that there were tanks at the port of Novorossiysk. Soon afterwards, virtually on a daily basis, both central and local newspapers, and radio and television kept providing ever new details on the "cooperative businessmen who were undermining the defense capability of the country," and who, in general, were discounting to the capitalists our national property for virtually nothing. The "ANT Case" exceeded the limits of an isolated case and became indicative of the attitude of people and organizations toward the development of the nongovernmental economic sector in general. The parliament actively joined in the discussion of this problem and a criminal case was instigated by the USSR Prosecutor's Office....

It was precisely during that complex period that our newspaper published its article. Without getting involved in arguments or, even less so, trying to anticipate the decisions of the parliament or the results of the investigation, at that time IZVESTIYA deemed it its duty to provide its readers information which would be, so to say, firsthand.

To this day, we are confident that the statement given to this newspaper at that time by a member of the government and head of one of the leading defense ministries was very timely and helped many people to look at the case without prejudice, on the basis of reason and a sober analysis. At that time, the minister frankly said that "a clearly abnormal situation has developed in the ANT

problem, some kind of hysteria and psychosis.... Actually, nothing strange or terrifying is taking place. This is a complex and painful process of demonopolization of foreign trade.... In the course of this process, occasionally things that are obviously abnormal take place...." Understandably, this was in reference to the puzzling fact that combat tanks, fully armed, had shown up at the port of Novorossiysk.

"I strongly hope that the investigation conducted by the Union Prosecutor's Office and the USSR Supreme Soviet, which became quite interested in this affair, will lead to some conclusions," emphasized A. Systsov at the end of the talk. "It will then become possible to draw conclusions as to what this was: an unsuccessful way of conversion to the new economy or the right path which must be followed further."

A year went by. This time was more than adequate to make sense of what was happening in the main, if not in the details. However, as in the past, nothing has become any clearer in the ANT matter. Our parliament forgot the tank scandal a long time ago, for it had to deal with new and more vital concerns. The Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov government resigned after founding this unfortunate ANT concern and, subsequently, leaving its offspring at the mercy of fate. Nor is the USSR Prosecutor's Office hastening with its conclusions. After 15 months of investigation it has as yet to charge a single ANT member.

Actually, the Prosecutor's Office should be a separate topic for discussion. Naturally, one can only be pleased by the fact that our investigators no longer deem sufficient speeches from party rostrums and newspaper publications in formulating charges against someone. B. Pogorelov, senior investigator in charge of particularly important cases, under the USSR Prosecutor General, who is in charge of the ANT case, is not in a hurry to act on the unequivocal hints of the leadership of the Russian Communist Party. V. Kalinichenko, the head of another group of investigators of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, speaking last Sunday on central television, quite calmly suggested that the case of the 140 Russian billions could, as with the ANT case, turn out to be a minor matter not involving a crime. It does appear that we are advancing toward a law-governed state. In the past, this circumstance alone would have been a reason for celebration: instead of simply sentencing all those involved to 10 years in jail, the case is investigated.

But let us truly try to understand whether there is any reason for joy? To start with, as a working hypothesis, let us imagine that ANT is not only totally innocent but, as the then head of government said at the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, it is an organization which is quite useful to our country. Does this change anything in our case? Absolutely nothing for, so far, the fact that ANT is not guilty has not been proved.

Judge for yourselves. For the past 15 months, an investigation brigade of the USSR Prosecutor's Office has

been investigating the ANT case and, to this day, no one has been charged. All there are, are witnesses. Does this mean that the ANT people could sleep calmly and that not a single one of them may be detained tomorrow, in six months or, let us say, in five years?

Absolutely not, for the preliminary investigation could last indefinitely, and any day now the status of anyone involved could change from that of witness to that of defendant.

Naturally, one may object to such a fear, saying that no investigation could be a threat to an innocent person whose conscience is clear. But this can be said only by someone totally unfamiliar with our economic laws and, particularly, with the latest law which deals with cooperative organizations. In our country, the freedom to investigate is total: one document frequently conflicts with another, and one legal act with a number of other legal acts, and so on, and so forth. Everything is in motion, everything is only being created. However, this does not make the life of the members of cooperatives any easier. As one of the new entrepreneurs said, a cooperative member in our system is the same as a mine-layer: He walks on the minefield of our economy and every step may be his last. Furthermore, let us not forget the possibility of an error in the investigation and even of a judicial error.

What matters the most is something different: throughout the preliminary investigation a person is no longer himself. He must punctiliously be present whenever summoned by the investigator, regardless of how frequent and lengthy such summonses may be. His friends, acquaintances, and business partners could be interrogated at any time. His business documents could be read by the investigator or even confiscated at any time.

How long could a normal person live under such a "cover" and retain his sanity? And what if it is not a question of an ordinary citizen but of a major entrepreneur, how many business partners could he find?

But let us consider this situation further: What would happen if, let us say, the USSR Prosecutor's Office officially announces that the ANT is totally innocent?

In that case as well there would be no cause for great rejoicing. The reason is that the action was taken: essentially the ANT has been liquidated or, more accurately, both ANTs in the country have been closed down: the first, the legal, and the other, the practical. On 16 January 1990, only two days after the notorious "tank" report published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, the government closed down, with a resolution, the intersectorial state-cooperative concern (MGKK) ANT, which had been created only six months previously, that same ANT which was supposed to supply our country with consumer goods, worth 35 billion rubles, in exchange for Soviet nondisposable goods, goods which we are either unable to or cannot use ourselves. On a parallel basis, by "telephone law" the "primary ANT" was destroyed—

the industrial-state cooperative association (PGKO), which was founded in Noginsk, near Moscow, by Vladimir Ryashentsev, as early as 1987.

No, no document on the liquidation of the PGKO showed up, nor could it. However, the tank scandal and the campaign which followed, aimed at discrediting the cooperative movement as a whole and the ANT in particular, led to the fact that the partners in the association broke contracts which had already been signed, and interrupted all contacts with the "plagued" organization or even simply robbed their partner who was in trouble. For example, many enterprises which had sold to the association their hard-to-sell items, kept for a time in their possession an already sold commodity for which they had been paid, in "responsible storage." Following the "tank scandal," some of them hastened to recover their goods without, however, refunding the money.

A taste for "expropriation" remains ineradicable in some of our citizens....

But let us look at this problem from another side. ANT was routed. From a powerful state cooperative association with more than 5,000 workers and fixed capital of 200 million rubles, as well as a developed structure of scientific and technical subdivisions and a strong scientific base, which promised to yield substantial dividends in the near future, essentially nothing remains. All that is left is the legal name, the seal, and the number of the bank account.

The question is: Who, if any, benefited from this?

"Even according to the most conservative estimates, direct losses from the crushing of the PGKO ANT amount to no less than 2 billion rubles," Vladimir Ryashentsev believes. "These are only the material losses. The losses from the liquidation of ANT, as the creator of a new economic sector, cannot be estimated."

Let the reader decide for himself whether he can trust this claim. To begin with, we should become better acquainted with the PGKO ANT and its creator and manager.

A great deal of interesting facts may be learned about him, such as, for example, that Vladimir Igorevich Ryashentsev, who has been repeatedly accused of cooperating with Western special services, was indeed a member, in the recent past, of special services but, ours, Soviet. He served in the KGB for seven years, from 1975 to 1982. What was his rank?

"I started as an ensign and left as senior lieutenant of state security," Ryashentsev answers.

Incidentally, according to Vladimir Igorevich, it was precisely while he was a member of the "special service" that he developed the idea of ANT.

"I joined the KGB after Army service," he explained. "In the Army I was a master sergeant. Here they made me an ensign and assigned me to the 'ninth,' external

security. My first posting was at the government cottages, in the Lenin Hills. Four hours on duty, four hours rest, and back on duty. I had time to think of this and other things. The more so since political work in the KGB was properly organized, we constantly attended lectures on irresponsibility, lost opportunities, and deficiency in our economy. I took up the study of foreign experience: it was interesting to find out why they were not wasting their opportunities. Gradually I developed, in most general lines, the idea of a firm in which science, technology, and production would all be united. I thought about how to organize the work in such an organization and how to interest the people....

"I did not think, it is true, that nine years later, in 1987, I would be able to put these ideas to a practical test."

"Let us see what your ANT actually dealt with."

"Which one? There were several: ANT-1, ANT-2, ANT-3, and so on. Each one had its area. ANT-3, for instance, was science: this was our main area of activities from the very start. We organized the cooperative in 1987, in Noginsk, under the local rayon consumer union. There were 16 of us and we had the very strong desire to create something new, something interesting. At that time, there was not even a hint about any kind of a law on cooperatives. However, there was a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers. This was a well-written document which made it possible to deal in anything one wished. Furthermore, we were lucky: In transcribing the bylaws, the typist made an error: instead of typing 'production-technical,' she typed 'production-technological cooperative.' The city executive committee did not notice the error and approved the bylaws. We were then able to convince them that if it is a 'technological' cooperative it means that we have the right to deal with science. And since in the first six months we had a profit of 6.5 million rubles, we were able immediately to invest the money in scientific development."

"Six and a half million in six months?"

"Yes. From the very beginning a strict principle was applied in the ANT: no contractual prices; everything to be based on state estimates or lower. You would not believe what tremendous profits are possible by working strictly according to state rates! Here is an example: At the start of 1988 the Moscow party obkom asked us to help to organize the work of the Noginsk heating equipment plant. They were quite unsuccessful in producing plunger pairs: the state price was 1.25 rubles but the cost to the plant 2 rubles. The ANT leased the shop and, one month later, production costs dropped down to 85 kopeks."

"How?"

"Company secret. I am not kidding: it is truly a secret, it involves know-how. We now even have the necessary computations on how to organize any type of production

in any area. At that time, however, I went to look the shop over, I looked and I analyzed. I also invented various things.

"Actually, I can share with you one secret. In any production facility there are technological personnel, i.e., servicing personnel and assistants. No one knows, however, how much servicing is needed although everyone understands, both the technologist and his assistant, that their salaries come from their output. In Noginsk we clearly proved this to the people: by the end of the month we went directly to the shop and gave to the brigades all the money they had earned. Then each brigade had to share the sum with the servicing personnel.

"One month later, not a single unnecessary person had remained in the shop...."

"What else was ANT engaged in?"

"The manufacturing of glass ceramics; the development and manufacturing of fiber-optics sensors; installing fire prevention alarm systems, based on our own designs, which were more convenient and reliable; a technology for manufacturing bricks from the waste of phosphorous fertilizers; membrane technologies. In Orel we rescued a defense enterprise which had been left without clean water: someone had put the dregs of fuel oil in the water and thus stopped production. We installed our own membrane filters and cleaned the water."

"The cooperative was allowed to work in a defense industry enterprise?"

"Not only in Orel. We carried out a number of assignments for the sixth sector of the USSR Council of Ministers. That sector dealt with the study of the economic situation in the country and the solution of some difficult problems. For example, someone would have an interesting idea but his own enterprise (institute, ministry) would not help or fund it. That person would file a complaint with the government, the complaint would go to the sixth sector, and what then? Order the minister? That would be useless. It was given to us and we provided financing and helped to develop a prototype and ensure the application...."

"Or else, our specialists were asked to go to some city or some plant and to help organize its production process. You are, they would tell us, managers and organizers, and so, give us advice!"

Ryashentsev laughed and then asked us:

"Do you know that the PGKO ANT itself was a 'post office box,' a secret enterprise? This was in accordance with the first department and other services, according to regulations. About 40 percent of ANT scientific developments were on confidential topics. Subsequently, this proved to be a hindrance. You understand, when the massacre of ANT began, it turned out that we could not even open our mouths: even the export and import operations of ANT were sealed."

After a short silence, Ryashentsev added: "Incidentally, let me add a small feature to the portrait of the 'octopus,' as Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov describes ANT: It was precisely here that one of the first primary party organizations in the cooperative sector of our economy was organized: in Moscow alone it numbered 110 party members."

Later, Petr Shpikin, one of Ryashentsev's closest associates, told us:

"You see, we believed that the system needed us. All of a sudden, total rout. This was a particularly hard blow to the rank-and-file ANT personnel; for we constantly kept telling them that the government is impatient, that this was needed by the country, and so on. Yes, ANT personnel enjoyed a living standard which was roughly twice as high as their colleagues' within the state system. However, we worked not for the sake of money or, more precisely, not only for the sake of money. We also had the freedom of creativity and, please do not smile, patriotism...."

We looked at the remaining contracts, looked at Ryashentsev's work notes, and listened to the stories of the personnel. What did the country lose as a result of the liquidation of ANT? It failed to obtain two powerful production lines for the manufacturing of engine blocks for farmers; the production of VCRs and sewing machines; the development of a domestic small-sized camcorder; a unique type of turbo-steam-diesel internal combustion engine....

"Why despair?" Ryashentsev asks. "All of this will happen. To begin with, by closing down, the ANT association 'released' a good 100 industrial-technological firms and by no means all of them were closed down. Second, many of the developments have been taken over or are being taken over by the Rossiyskiy Dom Industrial-commercial Company."

"Naturally there are losses for, when all is said and done, ANT has been idle for nine months. Contracts signed with domestic and foreign companies have ranged into tens of millions of dollars.... Incidentally, however, such contracts can be restored if our hands are untied, if the government shows the willingness to do so." We were bound to ask the following question:

"Vladimir Igorevich, what, nonetheless, was the reason for this rout? Was it the tanks?"

"No," Ryashentsev answered. "ANT neither ordered tanks nor purchased them. Today this is the main question to be answered by the USSR Prosecutor's Office: Why is it that instead of tractors, combat machines reached Novorossiysk? Who allowed them to leave the plant? On whose order?"

"Another question. ANT was a unique organization, functioning on the basis of special orders of the country's government. Why, therefore, when this routing began, did you fail to take the necessary steps?"

"What steps? I was asked by one of your colleagues: Why did I not, for example, ring up my friend Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and settle the misunderstanding? So?"

"Perhaps...."

"Because the USSR Council of Ministers chairman had never been one of my friends. If you want to know, I had not even met Ryzhkov."

"You carried out governmental assignments and not once met the head of the government?"

"No. Nor have I met Gorbachev or any other 'member of the political leadership,' as we say in our country. I know the rumors about ANT: it was claimed that it was a gathering of the offspring of 'big people,' for which reason ANT had been granted facilities. However, we have never obtained anything 'because of knowing someone.' ANT earned its reputation, that same business reputation it had."

Why have we now once again spoken of ANT? To begin with, it is time to dot the i's and cross the t's of this story. Second, although ANT may have stopped existing, it has left us the ideas and principles of ANT, which must be impartially assessed. Finally, there are the people of ANT who enjoy a rather high reputation in the West precisely because they are from ANT. And there is also a suspicion at home, again concerning ANT.

Actually, this should be the topic of a separate discussion.

Illegal Metal Shipment for Export Halted

LD0704224791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 6 Apr 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] An attempt to export unlawfully a large consignment of strategic raw material has been prevented at the Ilyichevsk sea port. Details in Sergey Fateyev's report:

[Begin recording] [Fateyev] The customs officers were struck by a small inaccuracy in the documents accompanying two containers that had already been sealed by the customs office in Bryansk. Antimony is a rare metal; without it, you cannot make quality electronic components, electrical equipment, or heat-resistant plastics. The price of a tonne of this material can reach R250,000. But here, through cunning operations, with documents from very respectable organizations, signed by very senior people, dozens of tonnes of antimony and hundreds of tonnes of antimonous lead were made out to be waste and all but given as a present to kind uncles abroad. [video shows men opening container; batch of papers; stacks of grey metal bars]

[V. Kolomiychuk, Ukrainian KGB city department employee] The USSR Academy of Sciences asked our government for a permit for a barter deal involving nonferrous metal waste. At the same time, it ordered from a Leningrad enterprise these products here, for pure research by the same Academy of Sciences, which then, while in transit from Leningrad through Bryansk, transformed into nonferrous metal waste.

[Fateyev] And whoever hasn't been dealing with this case of nearly successful smuggling—the former USSR Gosnab, the USSR People's Control, the local prosecution service, and the union prosecution service—the containers turned into storage facilities are still here, and material which is in short supply lies idly around. [video shows USSR Academy of Sciences papers, signatures of academicians N.P. Laverov and YE. P. Velikhov; containers; harbor] [end recording]

Latvia's Godmanis, Jurkans To Visit Poland, Sign Protocol

*LD2803174591 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
0530 GMT 28 Mar 91*

[Text] In the very near future, Ivars Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, and Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans are due to visit Poland. Agreement has been reached on signing a cooperation protocol at government level between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Poland. This has been

announced on his return from Poland by Andrejs Krastins, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council. He stresses that the Polish side is interested in forming good relations, while at the same time recalling a certain insecurity based on the complex relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

In talks with Sejm Deputy Speaker Olga Krzyzanowska, it was decided to form an interparliamentary institution for the two states.

Gen Powell's 'Threat' to El Salvador Decried*91UF0648A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Apr 91 p 1*

[Article by E. Alekseyev under the rubric "Notes on the Topic of...": "What Does the U.S. President Think?"]

[Text] Read this attentively: "Military action may be taken in El Salvador with a view to stopping an internal armed conflict there if peace talks between the Government of El Salvador and the guerrillas taking place in Mexico end without producing results." This is what General Colin Powell, chairman of the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras.

The words of the highest-ranking American general make it entirely apparent that the United States is prepared to intervene in the internal affairs of El Salvador by means of military force. Powell was clearly inspired to make so frank an admission by his memories

of U.S. armed interventions in Grenada and Panama and the blitz-victory over the Iraqi Army, which has gone to the heads of many.

The general's statement could be interpreted as the desire to just scare the Salvadorans. However, Powell holds too high a position in the U.S. military hierarchy to make careless statements. Therefore, his unequivocal threat is perceived as confirming the U.S. claim to the role of policeman in the Western Hemisphere as a modern interpretation of the "Monroe Doctrine," which Washington proclaimed as early as the 19th century. Therefore, the old doctrine based on the worst traditions of armed interference in the internal affairs of other states with a view to establishing there an order which is to the liking of the United States, is being adapted to a new international situation.

All that remains is to find out what the attitude of the U.S. President is toward the doctrine outlined by the general, so that the world community will be able to judge the full measure of the danger it poses.

Gorbachev Visit, Trade With Japan Viewed

91UF0626A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 6 Apr 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by Yu. Subbotin: "Japan on the Eve of the Visit by President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev": "A Formula for a Breakthrough"]

[Text] Tokyo-Moscow—Saying that a visit by the president of the USSR to a particular country is special and unlike visits to other cities has, unfortunately, become a journalistic cliché, even though it seems that this should not cast any doubt on its correctness. Especially when it is a question of the upcoming Soviet-Japanese summit meeting in Tokyo.

Let me begin by saying that in general this is the first official visit by a head of the Soviet state, or even the prerevolutionary Russian state, to Japan. A special tone is imparted to this event by the absence of any peace treaty between our countries; which, in the opinion of some extremist Japanese politicians, means that a state of war still exists. Finally, any major turnaround in our relations, which manifestly do not match the potential of the two powers, has been made strictly dependent by the Japanese side on a resolution of the territorial issue—the most complex and painful in world politics in general.

During a recent 10-day trip with a group of Soviet journalists around Japan I tried to understand what lies behind this (to use the jargon of young people) "constant harping" by our interlocutors on the problem of the so-called "Northern Territories." For the inevitability with which they "surfaced" during conversations with state officials, political experts, and entrepreneurs reminded me of the doggedness with which at one time under the arches of the Roman Senate they used to say "Carthage must be destroyed!"

I am very well acquainted with the style of work of many Western journalists who visit our country: "home fare," more often than not in the form of an article already prepared, plus a few comments by Soviets whom they interview confirming the theses of the ready article, together with two or three local shots to set the scene, such as "I am standing here on Red Square" or "I am looking at the latest line." It is hardly worth their while crossing seas and continents and state borders for this. This is why I wanted to clarify things for myself as much as possible and try to bring to the reader the moods prevailing in political circles in Japan and in Japanese society—the moods that will influence the course of the upcoming talks and the future of our relations with a powerful neighbor to the East.

"Breakthrough—that is my favorite word," said the chief of the Soviet section in the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Department for Europe and Oceania, Kadzuhiko Togo, opening the conversation. "It seems to me that there is now a need for a breakthrough in Japanese-Soviet relations. This becomes particularly obvious if we

compare relations between our countries with the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and the countries of Europe. In practice this kind of breakthrough would mean signing a peace treaty, developing links in all spheres, especially in the economic field, and deepening mutual understanding and cooperation that exclude the use of force. It is quite possible that this will not occur in the next six months or a year, but the existing mutual desire for it nevertheless instills optimism. A minimum success is guaranteed for the upcoming visit. In any event it will lay the foundation for future advance. The Japanese side insists on priority resolution of the territorial question. And the Soviet side has traditionally taken an opposite approach: first it is necessary to develop all-around relations and then it will be possible to take a look at territorial problems. If it is possible to bring the positions closer together and find mutually acceptable solutions, this will also be a breakthrough."

Another of our interlocutors—Professor Ito, well-known political expert and president of the Japanese Association for Establishing International Ties—was inclined to be less optimistic. In his opinion the possibility of a zero result from the Soviet-Japanese summit meeting cannot be excluded. Professor Ito thinks that a minimum condition for success would be confirmation by the Soviet side of its adherence to the principles of the Joint Declaration of 1956, when the USSR agreed to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan following the conclusion of a peace treaty.

"If this does not happen," the professor emphasized, "then most of my compatriots will think that the visit was totally unnecessary."

This political expert is evidently very categorical in his judgment. A conversation with Tokyo students, for example, showed that territorial issues worry Japanese youth a great deal less. That, however, does not detract from their importance in our bilateral relations. We should not disregard the fact that all the main political forces in Japan are virtually united in this matter.

"The newspapers," said Professor Ito, "are reporting that Japan is ready offer the USSR help to the tune of \$28 billion if the territorial question is resolved. That is a great deal compared to the economic importance of the disputed islands."

I refrain from comment on that conclusion. That is a matter for the economists. Nevertheless, in and of itself this statement does deserve attention because it testifies indirectly that the principle that moves the Japanese is that of the indivisible nature of economics and politics, and this principle remains in force and may influence the course of the upcoming talks. I would like to believe that this will not mean attempts to take advantage of the present economic difficulties in our country to exert some kind of pressure on the Soviet side.

Meetings with the leadership of the All-Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations and other representatives of business circles in that country left no doubt about their interest in expanding trade and economic cooperation with our country. True, they spoke with vexation about the trend that has been seen recently toward reduced Japanese exports to our country because Soviet partners are not paying for them promptly. Japanese businessmen believe that this is a consequence of the somewhat hurried and not properly considered decentralization of Soviet foreign trade activity. Notwithstanding, the long-term prospects for our trade and economic relations seem to them to be extremely reassuring.

"We have relations of mutual compensation," said Mr. Aso, a representative of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in conversation with Soviet journalists. "The Soviet Union has colossal raw materials resources, while Japan is a leading exporter of finished goods."

Japanese entrepreneurs, however, do not believe that this is the only possible formula. As an example they cite Japan's trade and economic relations with China, in which annual turnover has reached \$20 billion with Japan (our turnover with Japan is about \$6 billion). Here they emphasize that the volume of finished output in Chinese exports to Japan is close to 50 percent.

Japanese businessmen believe that similar changes in economic relations with our country are quite realistic. They stressed that for this the Soviet Union requires only stability in its internal political and economic life and consistency and care in the implementation of reform. In their opinion the haste and lack of control in privatization may lead to a significant decline in the role played by the government in economic management and to destabilization of the latter, and as a consequence, to significant deterioration in the prospects for Soviet-Japanese economic relations. Under present conditions Japanese private companies have in many cases had to display caution in establishing contacts with Soviet partners. And according to representatives of the business circles, because of the outstanding territorial problem, the Japanese government is not offering support for private business in relations with the USSR.

So we return once again to the dilemma: What should be first—the development of cooperation or resolution of the territorial disputes? Which one Japanese with whom we spoke compared to the well-known sophism about the chicken and egg. It remains to be hoped that at the upcoming Soviet-Japanese talks common sense will be given priority; this will make it possible for relations between the two states to reach a level corresponding to their roles in the modern world.

Economic, Scientific, Technical Cooperation With USSR

91AE0311A Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 13 Feb p 2

[Article: "Emphasis on Importance of Developing Cooperation in Areas of Electricity, Agriculture, Trade, Tourism"]

[Text] The cabinet has approved the official record of the second session of the joint Soviet-Jordanian Committee for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which was held from 23 to 30 October 1990. In this session, progress was noted regarding economic and technical cooperation between the two countries since the Economic and Technical Agreement was signed on 21 January 1969. In this regard, the fulfillment was noted of the Soviet Union's obligations resulting from this agreement with regard to supplying equipment for the electrification of towns and villages in Jordan's central region, and equipment for training centers in Irbid, al-Mushari, and al-Salt.

Electricity

The two sides believe in the abundance of real possibilities for cooperation, between agencies concerned in both countries, in the field of electricity. The Soviet side stated that its agencies wished to participate in implementing certain projects in the five-way electricity net with Jordan's neighboring countries, as well as projects concerning the electricity grid between Egypt and Jordan. The Jordanian side stated that projects like those are to be arranged through international bids, and that it would welcome the participation of Soviet agencies in this bidding.

Moreover, the Jordanian side expressed its desire to develop cooperation with regard to rural electrification, through its being provided with materials required for this purpose, specifically the requirements of electricity distribution networks, including insulators and transformers valued at \$3 million. The Jordanian side requested that it be supplied with these materials by the Soviet authorities on convenient and easy terms. The Soviet side requested that payment be expedited for pending debts, which stem from previously supplying Jordan with materials, valued at approximately 1 million rubles. The Soviet side submitted a memorandum in this regard to the Jordanian side, and the latter promised to study the Soviet request, to follow up on it with the Jordanian quarters concerned, and to reply as soon as possible.

Phosphates

The two sides discussed the developments that occurred after the signing of the Agreement of Mutual Understanding—dated 14 April 1989—between the two countries, concerning the establishment of a project to produce phosphoric acid. They agreed to study the possibility of establishing this project with an Indian or

Finnish company, aiming at a production capacity of 360,000 tons of phosphoric acid, including 180,000 tons of super phosphoric acid.

A feasibility study is being made concerning the establishment of a project to produce phosphoric acid, with a capacity to produce 180,000 tons of super phosphoric acid, to cover the needs of the Jordanian and Soviet markets. With regard to the portion exported to the Soviet Union, the study is focussing on the plans and equipment required for this project, and the costs of sending experts to Jordan. The possibility is also being studied of importing the aluminum and sulfur required for the project existing currently in al-'Aqabah, and producing secondary aluminum phosphate.

Agriculture

The two sides agreed that the Jordanian authorities would continue to study the Soviet agencies' proposals concerning the construction of multi-tiered greenhouses, and single-tiered plastic greenhouses, which represent protective agriculture. Moreover, pursuant to the proposals previously submitted to the Jordanian side, the two sides agreed that the authorities concerned from both countries would hold discussions regarding these proposals at the first possible opportunity, while the Soviet side reiterated the willingness of Soviet agencies to study the possibility of participating in building the al-Wahdah Dam project on the al-Yarmuk River. The Jordanian side welcomed that, and promised to notify the Soviet side of the probable sources of financing for this project.

Furthermore, the Jordanian side expressed its desire to work together with Soviet agencies in the areas of cattle breeding, the use of biological means to combat diseases and insects, modern veterinary methods, mutual exchange of veterinarian supplies, and the training of experts in fields of sheep breeding and artificial insemination, as well as in areas of combating desertification and dealing with land salination.

In light of the positive results of previous cooperation in training national cadres, the two sides emphasized their readiness to increase this cooperation, through the establishment of new training centers, importing additional equipment and spare parts, and devising methods of supportive clarification for existing centers, with the assistance of Soviet authorities. In addition, the sending of Soviet teachers and technicians, in accordance with Jordan's requirements, was referred to. The two sides also referred to the possibility of sending Jordanian specialists to the Soviet Union to train in industrial fields, on a contractual basis.

Other Areas of Cooperation

With regard to exploiting Dead Sea salts, the two sides see the possibility of technical cooperation, on a contractual basis, to establish a complex to produce potassium sulfate, based on the potassium chloride produced by the current project on the shores of the Dead Sea, as well as

sodium sulfate. The two sides agreed that in order to discuss the technical and organizational problems associated with this project, experts from the agencies concerned in both countries—TAGROMO EXPORT and AGROHIM—would meet in Moscow in January 1991 and in the Soviet Research Institute in Leningrad, in order to make the necessary decisions in this regard.

The Jordanian side suggested the possibility of cooperation in exploiting oil shale for energy-producing purposes, especially by building an exploratory electrical generating unit, with a five-megawatt capacity, through the use of the most modern Soviet technology. In addition, studies should be conducted in Soviet research centers on Jordanian raw minerals, such as alkali, feldspar, silicate sand, tripoli, etc., for the purpose of determining methods to exploit these materials and raise their value, in order to put them in the service of various industries.

Moreover, a joint company should be established for the exploitation of Dead Sea salts and minerals for industrial purposes, as well as for the fishing industry, and for the construction of pipelines and fuel storage tanks.

Development of Forms of Cooperation

The two sides noted with pleasure the active search for new directions and forms of cooperation between Jordanian and Soviet agencies and companies, which has resulted in several projects for 1990.

The Soviet side referred to the possibility of joint investments either in the Soviet Union or Jordan, and in this regard the Soviet side submitted investment proposals for Jordanian agencies and companies including:

- Rebuilding old structures in the Soviet Union, and utilizing old and new buildings; and,
- Constructing and utilizing tourist and other hotel complexes in either of the two countries.

Dimensions of Trade Relations

The two sides also reviewed the movement and level of mutual trade between them, and referred to the progress that has been achieved in this regard, especially the increase in volume of Jordanian goods imported into the Soviet Union. A large number of Jordanian and Soviet agencies have entered into commercial exchanges between the two countries.

The two sides pointed out that achievements in this field are still below the aspirations and potentialities of the two countries, and agreed on the need to increase their efforts, in order to bring a greater number of Jordanian and Soviet agencies and companies into the trade arena between the two countries, and to choose appropriate mechanisms to achieve a larger trade volume.

The two sides stressed the importance of holding trade fairs in both countries, i.e., a Jordanian trade fair in Moscow, and a Soviet trade fair in Amman. The Soviet side agreed to make final arrangements to hold the

Jordanian trade fair in Moscow, during the visit to the Soviet Union in November 1991, which will be made by a delegation from the Jordanian trade centers' agency. The two sides also stressed the importance of stepping up the exchange of visits by business delegations, in order to become familiar with the possibilities of developing and expanding trade and economic cooperation between the two countries, and to arrange all facilities to achieve that goal.

Tourism

The two sides referred to the growth achieved in the field of tourism cooperation between the two countries in 1989. This growth was expected to increase during 1990, but the changes that unexpectedly occurred in the region had a negative effect on that. In this regard, the two sides emphasized the need to bolster tourism cooperation, and stressed that tourism authorities concerned in both countries should hold a joint conference during the first quarter of 1991, in order to discuss and develop a program for tourism cooperation between the two countries.

Moreover, the possibility of scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries was also discussed. The two sides agreed that the Jordanian side would submit its proposals concerning the subjects and directions of cooperation in these fields. In addition, there is mutual interest in cooperation in the health area, and the two sides recommended that authorities concerned in both countries study the possibility of exchanging experts and expertise in this regard.

Trade Unions Appeal In Behalf of Kurds

91P50161A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Apr 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Stop the Brutality"]

[Text] The Iraqi Kurdistan Front recently made an appeal regarding the fact that the Kurdish people are being subjected to genocide on the part of the Iraqi regime. The appeal states: "Cities and villages are burning; the blood of children, women, and old men is being shed. The entire might of Iraq's military weapons has attacked Kurdistan."

The Iraqi Kurdistan Front called upon all people of good will to unite efforts to help the Kurds defend their lives, the future, and freedom.

The world community, by a special resolution of the United Nations, has censured Baghdad's repression of the Kurdish population. A number of countries and international organizations has started to give humanitarian aid to the Kurds.

The members of the Soviet trade unions appeal to the Iraqi authorities to stop the injustice and brutality against the Kurds of Iraq, who are standing up for their legal international rights.

Israeli Minister Sharon Views Emigration, Soviet-Israeli Ties

91UF0650A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 2, Jan 91 p 20

[Interview with Ariel Sharon, Israeli minister of housing construction, by SOYUZ special correspondent Lev Aleynik; in Jerusalem, date not given: "Ariel Sharon: In Essence, We Are Now Building Our Country Once Again"]

[Text] A growing stream of Soviet migrants to Israel has caused quite a number of problems for this small state. What are these problems? How are they being solved? SOYUZ special correspondent Lev Aleynik visited Jerusalem and interviewed Ariel Sharon, who holds a key position in the government—that of minister of housing construction and head of the Committee for Immigrant Absorption.

[Aleynik] Many Soviet people whose relatives have left for your country and Jews who intend to migrate here are concerned about the issue of repatriation. How is this complex process progressing, minister?

[Sharon] Indeed, the number of migrants from the Soviet Union has already exceeded 200,000 in 1990 alone. Since 1980, a quarter of a million of our fellow citizens have migrated to Israel. According to our calculation, this number will come to between 300,000 and 400,000 in 1991, given that difficulties in the USSR do not worsen. We are prepared to accept all the Jews of the world. However, as of now the situation is as follows: Deadlines for the construction of housing are in no way tied to the number of arrivals, and I find the rate of housing construction absolutely unsatisfactory. The issues of job placement and the spiritual absorption of the people who have been severed from Judaism for 70 years, for more than three generations, are also acute. They come to Israel, and they have to learn the age-old way of life of the people, Judaism, and Tanakh which is not only the cornerstone of Ivrit [Hebrew] but also the basis for perceiving the world around us. The new arrivals have to learn all of this, and this means that schools are also needed... In a word, we need to build half a million apartments in Israel within four to five years. For comparison, I will say that in the last 100 years 1.5 million apartments have been built here.

[Aleynik] Perhaps, this is not all. Should a normal social milieu for those arriving be created?

[Sharon] Subsequent projects will be carried out within 10 to 15 years. This is why I call on the entire Jewish people throughout the world, as on our reserve and support, to be fully mobilized, and to help Israel accomplish this tremendous task in every way possible. After all, this is not a problem for Israel alone but rather for the entire Jewish world.

Of course, the success of this great endeavor will depend to a considerable degree on the further development of

relations with the USSR, which we value highly. After all, as early as 1948, when the formation of the State of Israel was proclaimed, the USSR was precisely among the first ones to recognize us, and this amounted to substantial help. We were given this help, and this was very important. Let us not discuss what the main reason for this was—ridding the region of the British presence, or something else. Be that as it may, the fact remains that we were given timely support and the aid we needed so much.

However, a protracted period of "cold" between our countries set in later for 40 years. At the time, the USSR failed to understand that a group of small-town emigres actually governed the country—they were our parents and grandparents "from Minsk, Dvinsk, and Pinsk" who then represented 150,000 Israelis in politics. Of course, they were idealists and Zionists.

[Aleynik] However, were they steeped in Russian culture?

[Sharon] I remember my parents, who came from Russia. I was born here, in Israel. Well, my father was an agronomist, a scientist, and he took a great interest in the application of his knowledge in various areas of agriculture. My mother dropped out in the fourth year of medical college in order to come here and develop our country together with the pioneers. I remember my mother, a former student, who walked around barefoot for at least four years. She just did not have shoes. But they recited Pushkin and Lermontov from memory at home. My parents, their friends, neighbors, and many acquaintances were the nucleus of the intelligentsia; they were steeped not only in Russian culture but at the same time in the ideals of Zionism. The feelings and interests of these strata of our fellow citizens could have laid the foundation for the best relations between Israel and the Soviet Union...

[Aleynik] As you see it, minister, why did a rapprochement fail to occur then?

[Sharon] Our state turned out to be "on the other side." The erstwhile attitude of the USSR toward the Jews was the main reason for this. It could have also been the only reason which prevented us from maintaining profound constructive relations. As soon as the Soviet Union changed its attitude toward the Jews we in Israel changed our attitude toward the USSR promptly. The future of our mutual relations depends on whether profound reforms in the USSR continue, particularly those associated with ensuring conditions for the Jews to study their language, the Torah, and the Talmud, and with freedom of religion and emigration to Israel.

[Aleynik] However, let us return to the issue of repatriation. I ran into a tent city here, in Jerusalem, literally 100 meters from the Knesset. I talked to young families who have lived in tents with their children for eight months. I saw tent cities in Ashdod and other places. The

people maintain that the situation is critical, the city halls promise help, but how long can they wait for what has been promised?

[Sharon] You cannot argue with this. Many people do not have it easy here. This is what our plans are: To import prefabricated homes and to increase their production inside the country, and to speed up housing construction in the country. Look at the map where we are planning to house the first million of new fellow citizens in the immediate future. Half of them will be settled in the northern part of the country and in the Negev area. The other half will live in Jerusalem and on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The construction of small new towns for 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants has already begun. However, large cities will also grow, for example Be'er Sheva', Ashqelon, Dimona, Karmi'el, and Zefat. In essence, we are now building our country once again. Housing prices will begin to decline in keeping with the laws of the market only after a multitude of new apartments and houses are created.

[Aleynik] Many of the people with whom I happened to meet during my trips in this country believe that so far the construction potential has been used far from adequately. Design documentation, equipment, construction materials, and even labor are in short supply everywhere, despite a certain rate of unemployment. Do you, minister, have plans to somehow use the new arrivals in conjunction with this and to somehow get them involved in the construction process, which is without parallel in Israeli history?

[Sharon] Professional construction employees themselves find their way to both private and state contractor organizations and construction companies. In addition, there are many courses for retraining construction workers. However, we do not have an opportunity to refer the people en masse to a given kind of work: All contractors do what they want, despite the fact that by now there are many public organizations set up in order to help the new arrivals, for example, "Drive Your Wedge in the Country." They have asked the government to give them an opportunity to settle in several places and to build houses and apartments for themselves there. We have given them this right. However, we cannot allow "semi-guerrilla" groups of people to seek out construction materials and so on for themselves, seize land, and conduct uncontrolled construction.

[Aleynik] Do you intend to cooperate with other countries, including the USSR, in this endeavor?

[Sharon] Your Soviet press met my recent visit to the USSR with regard to these issues and commented on it rather disapprovingly. Still, I will say that we hope to get your help. The goal of the trip was also to determine whether Soviet construction techniques can be used here, in our country: Will Soviet companies be able to take part in fulfilling our plans? I believe that the performance of the USSR is good in the area erecting large-block buildings and in putting up the "skeletons"

of houses. In a word, if the USSR is ready we will be happy to get an exchange under way: Soviet construction workers will erect building structures here, in Israel, and we will supply fruit, vegetables, cheese, meat, fish, and other foodstuffs to pay for labor, technology, and construction materials.

In general, very many good things may be accomplished along these lines, but on one significant condition: Everything must be mutual. Despite the fact that Israel is a small country, and the USSR is a big one, the equality of rights in our relations should be complete. A mutual understanding and the comprehensive development of relations between our countries will undoubtedly be a mutually advantageous endeavor.

Israeli CP Leader Views Soviet Role in Gulf Events, Mideast Issues

91UF0609A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 29 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Tawfiq Tubi, general secretary of the Communist Party of Israel, by O. Fomin, consultant of the CPSU Central Committee Press Center: "General Secretary of the Communist Party of Israel T. Tubi: In the Gulf and on the Banks of the Jordan"; place and date not given]

[Text] **Tawfiq Tubi, general secretary of the Communist Party of Israel, a well-known figure in the international communist movement, and a great friend of the Soviet Union, has given an interview to O. Fomin, a consultant of the CPSU Central Committee Press Center, especially for the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.**

[Fomin] Comrade Tubi, what is your view of the latest events in the Persian Gulf area and the Soviet response to them?

[Tubi] From the very beginning of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, the Communist Party of Israel took a principled position in conjunction with the occupation of Kuwait which was fundamentally different from the position of the Israeli Government and other Israeli political parties. We denounced this unlawful action which is pernicious not only for the Kuwaiti people but also for the Iraqi people. Our party stated that the Iraq-Kuwait conflict could only be resolved peacefully within the framework of the League of Arab States and the UN. Our party supported the UN resolutions which demanded that Iraqi troops be withdrawn from Kuwait.

We came out resolutely against the concentration of multinational forces in our region under the pretext of "liberating Kuwait," which was actually aimed at establishing the dominance of the United States over oil riches and pursuing the strategic interests of American imperialism. Our party demanded that the armed forces of the United States and their allies be immediately withdrawn from the region, indicating the danger existing from their permanent presence.

Having come out against the imposition of Security Council resolutions by military means, we also stated that a double standard should not be applied in the process of ensuring international and regional peace. By this we meant the response of the world community to the occupation of Kuwait on the one hand, and its response to the resolution of the Palestinian problem and the unblocking of the Israeli-Arab conflict on the other hand. It is known that UN resolutions on the Palestinian issue and the Israeli-Arab conflict have not been complied with for decades due to the permanent political and military support given by the United States to Israel, which ignores the will of the international community. Proceeding from this, we stressed that after eliminating the crisis in the Persian Gulf the UN should embark on practical steps to implement the Security Council resolutions on the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Palestinian issue, and once again confirm the need to convene an international peace conference on the Middle East.

I keep recalling a statement by Comrade Gennadiy Yanayev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, which he made to journalists at the CPSU Central Committee press center in Moscow, in August last year, at the very beginning of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. He cautioned against one aggression (meaning the capture of Kuwait by Iraq) being suppressed by a new aggression unleashed by a third country. However, the official position of the Soviet Union, under the former leader of its foreign policy department, actually panicked to the American military presence in the region.

We took a critical view of UN Security Council Resolution 678, which gave the United States "a green light" to unleash a war on Iraq. We criticized the actions of the Soviet and Chinese representatives—the former for voting in favor of the resolution, and the latter for abstaining. We were profoundly convinced that the adoption of this resolution, which has placed war within the framework of international law, should have been prevented.

It is beyond any doubt that an energetic and effective policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East would have facilitated the realization of the lawful expectations of the people of the Middle East—the withdrawal of all foreign armies from the region, an end to Israeli occupation, and the establishment of a just Palestinian-Israeli peace.

[Fomin] Could you please tell us about the internal political situation in Israel and prospects for its development.

[Tubi] The war in the Gulf has imperatively brought up for the broad circles of Israeli society the urgency of settling the Israeli-Arab conflict, thus eliminating the danger of war and ensuring peace and stability. At present it is clearer than ever that this old conflict and the failure to resolve the Palestinian issue are the main fuses for war in the Middle East.

During the war in the Gulf, which lasted 45 days, the Israeli authorities forbade movement in the occupied Palestinian territories, subjecting 1.7 million Palestinians to house arrest. The West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip were turned into a collective prison, whose inmates were deprived of not only the right to work, but frequently of their daily bread. The war in the Gulf brought greater police arbitrariness and was used to suppress the continuing uprising of the Palestinian people. The number of those imprisoned rose to 15,000, and the number of deportations increased abruptly. The occupation regime resorted to a new form of tyranny: It was forbidden for the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to travel to their jobs in Israel; they began to throw these people and the Arab citizens of Israel out of their jobs, replacing them with Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. Before the war, 120,000 Palestinians from the occupied territories worked in Israel whereas at present fewer than 20,000 do.

Both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples have an acute need for peace, safety, and a guarantee of quiet life. However, the right-wing Shamir government behaves in an increasingly extremist manner and reinforces its positions. During the war in the Gulf, this government began to draw the support of 66 out of the 120 Knesset members. A new minister representing the Moledet Party, which advocates the deportation of Arabs both from Israel and the occupied territories, joined Shamir's cause. This party has two deputies in the Knesset. The new minister, Knesset Deputy Rehav'am Ze'evi, is a successor of the racist and fascist Meir Kahane.

Prime Minister Shamir staunchly refused to take any steps toward a peaceful settlement until the completion of the Gulf war. Finally, in conjunction with a visit to Israel by James Baker, he recently started talking about a return to a draft adopted by the Israeli Government in 1989 which provided for talks with elected representatives from the West Bank and Gaza (with the exception of East Jerusalem) who do not side with the Palestine Liberation Organization. According to the draft, the talks should be held under the auspices of the United States, with the participation of Egypt and Jordan, and should end in the adoption of administrative autonomy for the Palestinians under Israeli control. However, a group from the cabinet of ministers headed by Ariel Sharon, which includes the most extreme elements, did not even want to hear about a settlement.

The Labor Party (the nucleus of the Ma'arakh bloc) was also forced to state its position in conjunction with the crisis in the Persian Gulf region and the stepped-up pressure of international public opinion calling for the settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict. It is significant that on this occasion an entire group of well-known and influential individuals in the Labor Party for the first time began talking about the need for a peaceful settlement which provides for the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of Jordan and in the Gaza Strip, next to the State of Israel.

For the first time, 45 percent of the leadership of the Labor Party officially confirmed a proposal to recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

As far as the traditional leaders of the Labor Party, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, are concerned, they are once again trying to bring back the idea of solving the problem at Jordan's expense by creating a confederation of the West Bank of Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and Jordan. This presupposes that the Jordan River will become a safe border for Israel.

We should note at this point that Israeli Government circles and the leadership of the opposition Labor Party are unanimous in categorically rejecting the idea of a complete withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied territories, as well as in negating the right of the Palestinians to their own independent state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, and in refusing to negotiate with the PLO. The path toward peace in the region has remained blocked for decades now.

Proceeding from its past experience, the Communist Party of Israel believes that a comprehensive and just peace in the region may only be ensured on the following conditions:

1. "Two states for two peoples," i.e., the creation of an independent Palestinian state next to the State of Israel.
2. An Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied by Israel in 1967—the Palestinian lands on the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Syria's Golan Heights, and south Lebanon.
3. Recognition of the PLO by Israel as the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.
4. Convening an international conference is the most reliable way to settle the Israeli-Arab conflict, of which the Palestinian problem is the heart. All parties to the conflict, including Israel and the PLO, should be represented at the conference convened under the aegis of the UN. Direct bilateral negotiations may occur in the course of the conference.
5. Turning the Middle East into a region free of all types of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) under international control, with a view to establishing there a just and guaranteed peace and interstate relations based on trust.

[Fomin] Comrade Tubi, what is your view of the progress of perestroika in the USSR? What would you like to wish Soviet communists?

[Tubi] We, Israeli communists, were inspired by perestroika in the USSR and the goals it has proclaimed. We saw it as a reaffirmation of the ideas of socialism, an expansion of democracy, an increase in the creative involvement of the working masses in the construction

of a socialist society. We viewed perestroika as correcting the errors of the past in socio-economic construction and the mode of government, as creating a rule-of-law state in which the rights of all individuals are respected. We also viewed perestroika as an increase of the leading role of the CPSU through gaining the trust and respect of the masses rather than by proceeding from an administrative command system.

We wish the Soviet communists the preservation of the unity of the party of Lenin and its vanguard and leading role in society, the overcoming of economic difficulties, and the defense of the socialist choice—the only guarantee of progress and prosperity in Soviet society. We also wish the Soviet communists success in overcoming ethnic discord and in preserving the integrity of the USSR, the unity of sovereign peoples, and states with equal rights. The future of all peoples and states

belonging to the Soviet Union, as well as the destiny of international peace and well-being of all humanity, depend on this unity.

A Telegram for This Issue

Cairo, 28. (TASS). Head of the Israeli Government Yitzhak Shamir stated that Israel is prepared to discuss the Palestinian problem "as a temporary measure." In an interview with Israeli radio, he noted that such a discussion is possible as part of a "balanced" process of moving toward peace with the Arab countries.

In the words of Shamir, Jordan, which could form an acceptable Palestinian delegation to such talks, could be in a position to make a tangible contribution to establishing peace in the Middle East.

Status of Cooperation With Mozambique Explained

91AF0824Z Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
21 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Naftal Donaldo: "Soviet Aid Will Continue, but on a Smaller Scale"]

[Text] The rationalization of Soviet aid to Mozambique is bound to conditions determined by the need to reconcile our national needs and the response capacity of the USSR. Meanwhile, despite the internal and external factors deriving from the domestic and international situation, Moscow will continue its technical cooperation with Maputo, so that the people of Mozambique may benefit from this aid.

The statement is that of the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Maputo, who was accompanied by the minister-counselor of the Soviet diplomatic mission in the Mozambican capital.

Soviet-Mozambican cooperation was initiated soon after the declaration of national independence and was developed on the basis of an economic and technical cooperation accord signed in February 1978 and on other intergovernmental agreements between Moscow and Maputo.

Within the framework of technical cooperation, the Soviet Union granted state credits to the Republic of Mozambique to defray the cost of sending specialists to assist in developing certain sectors of the nation's industry, such as geology, mining, agriculture, irrigation, fishing, and ship repair, as well as education and health.

Every year hundreds of Soviet specialists are working in Mozambique. With their help, we have created technical-professional schools, the Professional Pedagogical Institute, and the Agriculture Implements Plant in Beira.

The shipyards in the port of Maputo were put into operation, a broad program of geological surveys of mineral resources and hydrocarbons was conducted, and a geological map of the country was prepared.

In addition, more than 300 water wells were dug in rural areas of Gaza Province and two soil improvement brigades were formed to restore the irrigations systems in the Limpopo River valley.

Soviet advisors provided practical assistance to the National Planning Commission in drafting annual plans and long-range social and economic programs for Mozambique, even participating in the Triennial Program of Public Investments.

Soviet specialists took part in organizing activities in the Ministry of Mineral Resources and in the National Institute of Geology, in the ministries of Construction and Water, Industry and Power, and Agriculture, and in the secretariats of state for fisheries and technical-professional training.

In 1988/1989, the USSR contributed to the Africa Fund, sending more than 230 specialists, at no cost, to work in various fields in Mozambique, particularly in health and education.

The worsening political-military situation in Mozambique in the middle of the 1980's impeded certain Soviet-Mozambican technical and economic cooperation projects.

Under the circumstances, based on an agreement between the two parties, steps were taken to reduce the number of Soviet specialists and to suspend activities in certain areas of cooperation.

The suspensions affected the cotton program in Nam-pula Province, the geological surveys of mineral resources, and assistance in the exploration of tantalum deposits in Morrua (Zambezia Province), among other projects.

"Currently, more than 400 Soviet specialists are working on 25 Soviet-Mozambican cooperation projects. The specialists include college professors, technical-professional instructors, physicians, geologists, builders, well diggers, maritime pilots, earth movers, specialists in ship repairs, fishing crews, meteorologists, advisors to the National Planning Commission, and others.

"We can say that, despite all the problems we have faced during our cooperation with the People's Republic of Mozambique, we have managed to achieve positive results, not only from the standpoint of creating and constructing certain tangible projects, but also from the standpoint of training Mozambican cadres," acknowledged the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Maputo.

Problems Do Not Cloud Bilateral Relationship

Not everything that the Soviet Union has done in Mozambique could serve as a model of what technical cooperation between the two countries should have been.

According to the speaker, the USSR carried out its cooperation with regard to concrete projects in Mozambique. The bilateral contracts always included a clause regarding the training of Mozambican cadres.

In other words, in the first phase, the USSR sent specialists to work on the execution of a certain number of projects and each of these undertakings had and continues to have this structure for the training of Mozambican cadres, with the goal of replacing the Soviet specialists with Mozambicans in the future. According to data from the Soviet Embassy in the Mozambican capital, through all these years, over 9,500 Mozambican specialists at various levels have been trained in teaching establishments created in Mozambique with Soviet participation for purposes of bilateral cooperation, as well as in intermediate and higher institutions in the USSR.

In 1990 alone, more than 900 Mozambican specialists benefited from this cooperation.

Also last year, with the collaboration of Soviet teachers, more than 459 Mozambicans were trained at the Industrial Training School of Nampula, the May Day Industrial School in Maputo, the Industrial School of Matola, and the School of Topography in Machava.

Since the day when these teaching establishments went into operation, more than 3,500 Mozambicans have been trained with Soviet assistance.

Soviet professors are also at the Eduardo Mondlane University; they are participating at the Superior Pedagogical Institute, not only as instructors, but also preparing educational materials, including manuals and other teaching materials.

However, the USSR does not have the right to oversee the effective use of all the Mozambican specialists trained by its citizens.

"We have practically no information about the employment of Mozambican specialists who were highly trained, both in institutions of higher learning in the Soviet Union and in Mozambican institutions created with our assistance," complained the diplomat.

What little information exists leads to the conclusion that not all these graduates find a place in the Mozambican labor market and occasionally have to seek employment outside the country.

The training of Mozambican cadres by the USSR was based on a plan envisioning the later replacement of the Soviet specialists in Mozambique.

In 1990 alone, more than 300 Mozambican specialists were trained in bilateral cooperation programs.

The Soviet diplomat cited the case of the naval shipyards. Between 1982 and 1990, some 140 highly skilled operators were trained, which made it possible to cut the number of Soviet specialists from 75 to 15.

"We must bear in mind that the volume of work at this shipyard complex has been increasing every year. The same measures, taken at the Soviet-Mozambican mixed company Mosopesca [Mozambican-Soviet Fishing Enterprise], made it possible to reduce the total number of Soviet specialists and crew from 170 to 100."

He added that Soviet specialists are assigned to work in the Republic of Mozambique under very advantageous terms for Mozambique, based on the concession of credit, or at no cost, or based on commercial contracts that do not meet the average salary of cooperants from other countries.

As the diplomat explained, the fact that the Soviet specialists were paid less than cooperants from other countries did not mean that Moscow undervalued their efforts or efficiency, but that, in light of the difficulties Mozambique was experiencing, Moscow took this step to enable Maputo to save a certain amount of foreign exchange.

Regarding the intent to reduce the Soviet technical cooperation in Mozambique, the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Maputo stressed that, in practice, it is simply a matter of rationalizing the cooperation.

The purpose is to bring cooperation into line with the needs of Mozambique and the resources of the Soviet Union.

Examining the improvement of cooperative ties between the two countries, the Soviet diplomat offered some recommendations, along lines that reflected a concern to make this technical cooperation more stable and profitable, based on the experience gained by the Soviet Union.

South African Firm to Supply Diamond Mine

91AF0933Z Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 22 Mar 91 p 34

[Text] A R[and]500,000 contract to supply 14 diamond sorting tables to two mines in Russia has been awarded to the South African company Komdresco of Wadeville. Komdresco is the newly formed joint venture between KSA equipment and Dresser South Africa.

The contract which was negotiated via a trading house in Vienna includes the supply of spares for the refurbishment of diamond sorting tables supplied by Dresser 20 years ago.

"We will be sending a technician to Vienna to train a group of five Russians in the use and maintenance of the tables," Komdresco's Shane Fitzpatrick reports, adding that the company recently supplied similar sorting tables to Japan and the United States.

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